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As urbanisation rates increase in parallel with growing climate change concerns, African 
cities are increasingly required to explore and support adaptation planning that reduces 
climate risks for the most vulnerable. Informal settlements are particularly vulnerable to 
climate change due to their high density, limited service provision, and a lack of economic 
and political opportunities for residents. In Cape Town, informal settlements face disastrous 
floods every year in the rainy season due to their location on degraded, low-lying lands as a 
result of Apartheid spatial planning. This thesis explores how multi-scalar governance in 
Cape Town can either empower or undermine efforts at community-based adaptation (CBA) 
to flooding in informal settlements. Drawing on urban political ecology, this thesis assesses 
the potential for CBA to lead to wider transformation. Using a case study approach, it focuses 
on the informal settlement network (ISN), a community-based organisation of the urban poor. 
ISN members and other actors involved in flood management in Cape Town were 
interviewed to understand the flood management landscape and the relationships and 
dynamics that exist between the various actors.  The analysis showed that the CoCT’s efforts 
at participatory planning reinforce the hegemonic power dynamics between government and 
communities, but that everyday governance practices can be used at a smaller-scale to 
enforce positive change. In reaction to top-down governmental processes, ISN uses insurgent 
planning to envision a more just city. They navigate sanctioned and un-sanctioned spaces of 
citizenship to drive development from the bottom-up. The community designed and spear-
headed reblocking process (rearranging shacks in a settlement to allow for flood drainage and 
service delivery) is a powerful example of CBA and represents the potential of community-
based organisations to take steps towards transformation. In order to enable true 
transformative CBA, both the CoCT and ISN need to adjust the epistemological framing of 
their planning processes in order to address the drivers of vulnerabilities, rather than just the 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background of the Study 
More than half of the world’s population is now living in urban areas (Dodman & 
Satterthwaite, 2008). Of these people, about 30 percent live in crowded informal settlements 
(slums, shanty towns) on the outskirts of cities with limited or no access to basic services, 
livelihood opportunities, or resources for political mobilisation (PSUP Nairobi, 2016). Many 
of these settlements are highly exposed to environmental risk such as flooding or landslides 
(Ziervogel et al., 2016b; Satterthwaite et al., 2007; Douglas, Alam & Maghenda, 2006). 
Located in high-risk areas and lacking basic requirements, these urban dwellers are extremely 
vulnerable to environmental hazards, including impacts from climate change. While the 
attribution of these events to anthropogenic climate change is still being studied, the evidence 
of vulnerability is clear, and scientists agree that extreme events are likely to increase (IPCC, 
2014). Climate change will also lead to higher temperatures, sea level rise, and coastal storm 
surge which can negatively impact land and soil quality, human health, freshwater resources, 
infrastructure and services (Munzhedzi et al., 2016). 
Adaptation has become a major priority for African countries where reliance on natural 
resources is crucial for many people’s lives and livelihoods (Ziervogel et al., 2016a). 
However, many adaptation strategies and resources are focused on rural areas, despite the 
increasing urbanisation rates and resulting challenges for urban service provision and 
infrastructure (Ziervogel et al., 2016b; Kiunsi, 2013). Governing climate change issues in 
urban areas is complicated by high levels of informality, where data might be lacking or 
changing often (Dodman & Satterthwaite, 2008). Informality also exacerbates sensitive issues 
around land tenure and land security, and overcrowding makes access and service provision 
difficult (Joubert, 2014).  
Community-based adaptation (CBA) has been touted as a pro-poor strategy that can be 
considered “adaptation as development” (Archer et al., 2014). However, CBA follows the 
same pattern as general adaptation in that it is often focused in rural areas around natural 
resource management or agriculture (Satterthwaite et al., 2007). One example explains how 
an NGO in Bangladesh is working with rural communities to introduce technologies (like 
floating gardens or hydroponics) into flooded agricultural lands, using consultations to 




While this is certainly a commendable project with positive and empowering benefits to the 
community, it exemplifies how the ability of communities to respond from within is hardly 
ever the starting point. In urban areas, community-based approaches are rarely considered 
outside the tokenism of local participation in adaptation decision-making. In practice, this 
participation is often used to justify decisions that have already been made by NGOs or 
outside institutions (Christens & Speer, 2006). This thesis engages with this literature gap by 
focusing on how community-based organisations are adapting to climate risk in informal 
settlements in Cape Town.   
In Cape Town, one of the main environmental challenges faced in informal settlements is 
severe flooding, which occurs every year during winter rainfall. Climate change is expected 
to exacerbate this problem (Munzhedzi et al., 2016). Despite the City’s efforts in managing 
flooding through various plans and programmes, pervasive flooding still persists (Ziervogel 
et al., 2016b; Joubert, 2014). Some communities have taken flood response into their own 
hands. The Informal Settlement Network (ISN) in Cape Town is an example of a community-
driven initiative to better the lives of the urban poor. While not directly focused on issues of 
sustainability and climate change, ISN is committed to the pro-poor development of informal 
settlements that in general, leads to less vulnerable communities. However, urban 
governments also have a great responsibility to reduce the vulnerability of their populations 
(Dodman & Satterthwaite, 2008). As Satterthwaite et al. (2007: viii) bluntly observe, “…you 
cannot adapt infrastructure that is not there”. Many informal settlements in Cape Town lack 
basic services and infrastructure (such as functioning stormwater drains) that would help to 
significantly reduce the risk of flooding in communities (Ziervogel et al., 2016b; Joubert, 
2014). Multi-scalar governance, which involves actors at every level of government as well 
as communities, civil society and private organisations, is necessary for managing complex 
policy decisions like adaptation plans for climate change (Vedeld et al., 2015). Given the 
differentiated resources and institutional capacity at different levels of government, multi-
scalar governance that is supported by municipalities is extremely important. Multi-scalar 
governance that supports pro-poor urban development and appropriate adaptation decision-
making should also be supported by communities, as climate change will disproprortionately 
impact the poor.  
Urban Political Ecology (UPE) offers a critical lens for understanding flood risk in informal 
settlements. UPE unpacks the power and politics involved in constructing a particular 




involved therein (Heynen, Swyngedouw & Kaika, 2006). UPE is an important lens through 
which to understand and critique urban dynamics because it starts from a normative position 
of acknowledging the uneven nature of urban environments (Heynen, Swyngedouw & Kaika, 
2006). Adaptation as transformation, which addresses structural inequality as the root cause 
of vulnerability through a social, transformational process (O’Brien et al., 2015), can be a 
method of responding to and preparing for climate change while also making cities more 
equal in the process. In Cape Town, one of the most unequal cities in the world 
(Razvadauskas, 2017), high levels of informal settlements, challenges around flood 
governance, and the likelihood of future climate risks makes for a good case study for 
understanding the potential for informal, urban CBA, particularly as this is a noticeable gap 
in adaptation literature. By analysing this case study from an UPE perspective, this study 
aims to contribute to a better understanding of how adaptation response can contribute to 
transformation. 
1.2 Problem Statement  
There are about 146,000 households in 437 informal settlements in Cape Town (Ndifuna 
Ukwazi et al., n.d.). A 2011 census revealed that for these households, 32 percent had no 
access to waste removal by the municipality, 53 percent had no access to sanitation, 19 
percent had no water supply, and 35 percent had no electricity (Housing Development 
Agency, 2013). Some settlements in Cape Town are located on city land, and are therefore 
serviced by the municipality (Joubert, 2014). However, because of the crowded and often 
disorganised way in which settlements develop over time, it is difficult for the city to service 
toilets or manage waste removal in the same way they do in the suburbs (Joubert, 2014). For 
illegal settlements on private property, the city does not have responsibility for provision of 
services, and the land owners are not required by law to provide services either, complicating 
the situation (Joubert, 2014). Outside of access to basic services, residents of informal 
settlements face many other stressors including health risks, environmental risks (flooding 
and fires, in particular), crime, unemployment and substance abuse (Richards, O’Leary & 
Mutsonziwa, 2007).1  
                                                 
1 For more information on residents of informal settlements (demographics, economic statistics, access to 






Every year during the winter rainy season in Cape Town, certain townships and informal 
settlements experience predictable flooding. The City of Cape Town recorded 88,000 homes 
at risk of flooding in 2009, with up to 13 percent of all informal settlement residents being 
displaced (Joubert, 2014). As a result of Apartheid spatial planning, many of Cape Town’s 
townships and informal settlements are located on the Cape Flats, a low-lying wetland (once 
a dune field) with waterlogged soils and a high water table (Joubert, 2014). Natural drainage 
has been disrupted by developments like houses and roads that alter stormwater patterns, 
while the formal stormwater management drains and detention ponds are often crowded with 
new residents and rubbish by the time winter rains arrive (Joubert, 2014).  Residents of flood-
prone areas experience similar challenges, including damaged property; hygiene and 
sanitation difficulties; health concerns from stagnant water and the wet and 
 
Figure 1. Flooding in an informal settlement in Cape Town (Bosch, 2013) 
cold conditions; work and school disruptions; electric shocks from wet wires; and poor waste 
management (Joubert, 2014). Many people live with these challenges because they have 
nowhere else to go, or because they were evicted from farms or government lands because of 
new housing schemes (Joubert, 2014)2.   
On land which belong to the City of Cape Town (CoCT), they are responsible for providing 
services and maintaining toilets and standpipes in informal settlements in line with the 
national government policy of free basic water and sanitation (City of Cape Town, 2017c). 
The city has set a target higher than the national policy, of one shared toilet per five 
                                                 
2 For more detailed information on flooding in informal settlements in Cape Town (including impacts and 






households and one shared tap per 25 households within 200 metres walking distance. They 
do acknowledge that flooding, unstable ground, private land, and dense settlements are all 
challenges making it impossible to place flush toilets in certain areas (City of Cape Town, 
2017c). For waste management, the city provides and collects two waste bags per week per 
household, and employs community members to help with street cleaning and rubbish 
removal (City of Cape Town, 2017a). 
The CoCT has a Disaster Management and Winter Preparedness Programme to address flood 
risk in informal settlements. It includes assessing risk, creating awareness, delivering disaster 
aid, improving service delivery, and infrastructure upgrades (Joubert, 2014). In 2017, the city 
organised the Winter Readiness Task Team, which brought together an inter-departmental 
group under the City’s Organisational Development and Transformation Plan3 (ODTP) (de 
Lille, 2017). The following departments participated in flood-risk reduction activities as part 
of the Task Team and ODTP: Disaster Risk Management Department (DRM); Solid Waste 
Management Department; Transport and Urban Development Authority; and Social 
Development Department (de Lille, 2017).  
Despite the CoCT’s efforts in reducing and responding to flooding in informal settlements, 
the same problem reoccurs every winter, with the CoCT and residents of informal settlements 
often blaming each other for the lack of positive change. For example, since the CoCT cannot 
service each home in informal settlements like it does in the suburbs, they manage waste in 
some settlements by providing a container that residents can fill with rubbish bags when it is 
unlocked4 by the CoCT prior to collection times (Joubert, 2014). However, residents often 
leave rubbish bags outside the container when it is locked, which leads to waste being washed 
into the stormwater drains, creating clogs and flooding (Joubert, 2014). The CoCT claims the 
residents need to manage this unsanctioned dumping, while the residents claim that the CoCT 
needs to improve communication and consistency with collection times (Joubert, 2014).  
When flooding inevitably happens, residents use various strategies to cope, such as raising 
their shacks, covering leaky roofs with plastic, creating makeshift walking bridges from 
pallets and rubble, digging drainage channels, using sand to absorb water, and finally, 
evacuating (Joubert, 2014). However, while these coping mechanisms at the household level 
                                                 
3 See more information on the ODTP here: http://www.capetown.gov.za/work%20and%20business/meet-the-
city/Our-vision-for-the-city/cape-towns-organisational-development-and-transformation-plan  
4 Rubbish containers are locked outside of collection hours so that they are not used for other purposes besides 




can be useful, they are short-term solutions, and can often lead to water flow changes that can 
flood neighbouring houses (Drivdal, 2016).   
Researchers have been examining this challenge in order to understand the barriers to 
improved flood management in informal settlements. A general consensus can be seen in this 
research regarding a shift from government to governance to address these barriers. Previous 
studies have identified the following challenges: 
• Lack of genuine collaboration with and participation by communities (Desportes, 
Waddell & Hordijk, 2016; Drivdal, 2016; Ziervogel et al., 2016b; Joubert, 2014) 
• Lack of internal collaboration between CoCT departments responsible for flood risk 
reduction (Desportes, Waddell & Hordijk, 2016; Ziervogel et al., 2016b; Joubert, 
2014) 
• Lack of transparency and trust between CoCT and residents of informal settlements  
(Desportes, Waddell & Hordijk, 2016; Drivdal, 2016; Joubert, 2014) 
• Different perceptions of the problem and ideas for solutions (Ziervogel et al., 2016b) 
• Lack of resources and capacity (Desportes, Waddell & Hordijk; 2016; Ziervogel et 
al., 2016b) 
• Over-reliance on technocratic approaches (Ziervogel et al., 2016b; Armitage et al., 
2010; Joubert, 2014) 
• Insufficient communication and information shared from the CoCT to informal 
settlement residents (Desportes, Waddel & Hordijk, 2016; Joubert, 2014) 
• Lack of longevity in political strategies (Ziervogel et al., 2016b) 
• Micropolitical disparities at the level of community governance (Drivdal, 2016). 
Many of these challenges were confirmed by the research involved in this thesis. These, 
along with additional challenges identified during the research process, are described in detail 
in section 5.2 below.  
1.2.1 Climate Change Implications 
Climate change projections show that while the Western Cape is expected to get hotter and 
drier, rainfall is likely to become more variable and extreme (Tadross & Johnston, 2012) . 
Given the location of most informal settlements on low-lying flood plains, more extreme 
rainfall would lead to increased flooding risks in these settlements. Importantly, non-climate 




blocked stormwater drains.  Residents of informal settlements are especially vulnerable to 
increased flood risk, as they often lack sufficient drainage and infrastructure, their homes are 
built with low-quality materials, and they have low incomes, which makes responding to 
flooding more difficult (Moser & Satterthwaire, 2010).  
1.3 Aim and Objectives  
In line with the research gaps identified in the literature review, the aim of this study is to 
understand community-based adaptation (CBA) to flood risk in informal settlements 
through an urban political ecology (UPE) lens.  
The following objectives contribute to the aim of the study: 
1. Understand how the different actors involved in managing flood risk within informal 
settlements (government, NGO, community groups) interact, manage and influence 
flood risk  
2. Understand the challenges and opportunities faced by ISN, a community-based 
organisation based in informal settlements, and the CoCT in responding to flood risk 
in informal areas 
3. Explore how experiences of multi-scalar governance between ISN and local 
government enables or undermines CBA in urban, informal areas 
4. Understand the potential for transformative CBA in urban, informal areas  
1.4 Organisation of the Thesis  
This research is organised into seven chapters. The second chapter assesses the literature on 
adaptation and flood adaptation governance in informal settlements, explaining where gaps 
exist within urban adaptation research, particularly around the potential for CBA and multi-
scalar governance. The second half of the second chapter provides an overview of UPE as a 
theoretical framework. The third chapter explains how this study engages with an UPE 
approach before providing contextual information to frame the study’s results. Chapter four 
describes the methodology of the study, describing the case study used and the methods of 
data collection and analysis, as well as limitations and ethical considerations. Chapter five 
presents the results of the study through a description of the flood management landscape in 
Cape Town. Chapter six presents the analysis of the results which centres around the 




Chapter seven concludes this study, summarising the findings and implications of the 





2 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Introduction 
This study grounds itself in existing literature while expanding upon research gaps identified 
during the literature review process. The conceptual debates and theoretical framework that 
relate to the problem statement and research objectives are adaptation, climate change 
governance, and UPE. Given that climate change impacts are already being felt across the 
globe, adaptation is an invaluable strategy for reducing the impacts of climate risk. This 
needs to be understood in the context of addressing other challenges plaguing the urban poor, 
especially in the context of increasing urbanisation in African cities (Satterthwaite et al., 
2007). Urban governments have a responsibility to respond to current and expected 
environmental risks by working to minimise the vulnerability of their residents (Dodman & 
Satterthwaite, 2008). The challenges posed by climate change require an inter-connected, 
comprehensive and collaborative multi-scalar governance approach that engages actors at all 
levels, particularly the most vulnerable actors, such as communities living in informal 
settlements in or around cities (Vedeld et al., 2015). While climate change is likely to 
exacerbate the already dire conditions in these settlements (Moser & Satterthwaire, 2010), 
there are also opportunities for governance mechanisms to capture community-led initiatives 
to build resilience and adaptive capacity from the bottom-up (Dodman & Mitlin, 2013). This 
study uses UPE as a critical lens in which to view CBA through ISN, a community-based 
organisation, as UPE offers the tools and theories necessary to interrogate traditional notions 
of risk, adaptation, and governance. By unravelling the complex processes at play in the 
urban environment and focusing on the drivers, rather than symptoms, of risk, UPE can help 
recognise the potential for CBA to lead to transformative change. This chapter systematically 
explores the concepts and theoretical framework mentioned above, examining the sub-themes 
of these concepts and expanding on the interconnections between them. Finally, this chapter 
identifies where the research could contribute to the literature, particularly on CBA and 




2.2 Literature Review  
2.2.1 Adaptation 
2.2.1.1 Adaptation as Development 
Adaptation is the “process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects” (Agard 
& Schipper, 2014:1758). When climate change concerns were first surfaced, adaptation was 
considered a short-term alternative that detracted from mitigation efforts (Dodman & Mitlin, 
2013; Ayers & Forsyth, 2009). However, since the Third Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) exposed that climate change impacts 
were already occurring, and mitigation efforts were slow-moving, adaptation has become an 
agenda item for international policy (Ayers & Forsyth, 2009; Huq et al., 2004). Particularly in 
Africa, adaptation resonates as important because of many people’s reliance on natural 
resources, as well as the likelihood of significant climate change impacts on the continent 
(Ziervogel et al., 2016a). Adaptation responses can include control (decreasing the likelihood 
of the problem occurring); coping (decreasing sensitivity to the problem); or avoidance 
(decreasing potential impacts of the problem) (Few, Brown & Tompkins, 2007). Many 
responses include engineering and technology solutions, often in the rural context, such as 
new seed varieties, agricultural techniques, water conservation management and early 
warning systems (Ayers & Forsyth, 2009). In addition, there is growing recognition of the 
importance of adaptation as a process that brings together multiple actors, supports social 
learning and explores the governance of adaptation (Ziervogel, Archer van Garderen & Price, 
2016).  
A growing number of researchers are beginning to recognise the importance of aligning 
adaptation with broader development goals. “Adaptation as development” has evolved 
partially in response to the highly engineering- and technology-based approach to adaptation, 
recognising that technical solutions alone are not sufficient (Inderberg et al., 2015).  
Development researchers argue that “risks posed by disasters and natural hazards are often 
linked more to social, economic, and even political factors in different contexts rather than 
simply the size of physical events such as storms and floods” (Ayers & Forsyth, 2009:25). 
The adaptation as development approach focuses on the underlying non-climatic social, 
political and economic causes of vulnerability (Inderberg et al., 2015). This approach 
complements development objectives while also advancing the adaptive capacity of the most 




describe the “synergies” between local development and successful adaptation, providing an 
example of how reducing poverty and improving housing, living conditions, and service 
provision are precursors for adaptation. In the same vein, Pelling (2011) argues that climate 
change should not be the target of development; that we should not be adapting to climate 
change but with climate change. 
2.2.1.2 Urban Adaptation  
Historically, national responses to long-term global climate change have not been prioritised 
in African countries, given the competing development challenges (Ziervogel et al., 2016a). 
However, climate change is increasingly becoming a policy item in African countries, mainly 
due to international policy processes such as the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Ziervogel et al., 2016a). Thirty-two African countries have 
submitted National Adaptation Plans of Action as part of the UNFCCC requirements, but 
despite high levels or urbanisation in African cities, the policy focus for adaptation has 
remained on rural areas and natural resources management (Ziervogel et al., 2016a; Kiunsi, 
2013; Satterthwaite et al., 2007). 
Urban adaptation research in Africa has been limited, but literature on the subject is growing 
(Ziervogel et al., 2016). Many studies have highlighted the institutional challenges facing 
urban adaptation in Africa, including limiting legislative frameworks based on national 
mandates, political instability, and limited availability of locally relevant climate change data 
(Leck & Roberts, 2015; Taylor, Cartwright & Sutherland, 2014; Pasquini & Shearing, 2014). 
In assessing urban climate change work in a number of African cities, Ziervogel et al., 
(2016a: 4) have highlighted the “need for increased political interest and will to address 
climate change, bringing in local actions through real forms of public participation, and 
overcoming fragmentation and silo-based planning and activities”. Satterthwaite et al. (2007) 
focus on the incapacity of urban governments to address the major deficiencies that are 
prerequisites for adaptation, such as ensuring infrastructure is in place to manage disasters 
and governments actually being willing to work in “illegal settlements”. 
2.2.1.3 Community-based Adaptation 
Research has increasingly focused on the importance of working with local actors, especially 
marginalised groups, to respond to climate change (Ziervogel et al., 2016b; Wamsler, 2016; 
Chu, Anguelovski & Carmin, 2016; Revi et al., 2014; Aylett, 2010). Community-based 




activities were insufficient due to their top-down orientation and lack of context-specific 
interventions using local knowledge (Dodman & Mitlin, 2013; Scott, 2008). This led to a 
“participatory” shift in development study and practice that emphasised communities taking 
charge of their own development processes as a crucial element defining project success 
(Dodman & Mitlin, 2013). Community-based adaptation is defined as “local, community-
driven adaptation…that focuses attention on empowering and promoting the adaptive 
capacity of communities. It is an approach that takes context, culture, knowledge, agency, 
and preferences of communities as strengths” (Agard & Schipper, 2014:1762). However, 
Dodman & Mitlin (2013) also highlight some weaknesses within CBA, such as its partial and 
local nature, its lack of understanding power dynamics within communities, and its failure to 
recognise risks outside of those related to climate change. Further, CBA tends to focus more 
on rural areas than urban areas; agricultural and rural livelihood adaptation are prominent 
features in many development initiatives (Satterthwaite et al., 2007).  CBA has the potential 
to contribute to the adaptation as development approach, but it must address the “social, 
economic, and political drivers of vulnerability as part of broader development processes” 
(Archer et al., 2014:346), a concept that mirrors the foundations of political ecology.  
2.2.1.4 Urban CBA 
CBA in the urban context is a response to increasing urbanisation leading to competition over 
scarce physical and natural resources in cities, which are also highly vulnerable to the 
exacerbating effects of climate change impacts (Archer et al., 2014; Soltesova et al., 2014). 
However, limited work has been done to record community-level adaptation and mitigation 
responses to climate change in urban areas in Africa (Ziervogel et al., 2016; Simon & Leck, 
2015; Archer et al., 2014). A review of literature concerning communities and adaptation in 
urban areas reveals that engagement with communities in an urban setting is typically labeled 
as “community participation”, implying that there are limited examples of adaptation that are 
driven from the ground-up. While some research exists on urban adaptation and CBA 
separately, few studies have combined the two. Soltesova et al.’s chapter (2014) is one of the 
studies that does focus on the potential for upscaling urban CBA. Soltesova et al. (2014) 
highlight the importance of both “hard” infrastructure and technological solutions to flooding, 
paired with “soft” socio-economic and environmental features. The authors also stress the 
importance of building upon current CBA practices, rather than replacing them, and 




Data on CBA is especially lacking in informal settlements, where issues of governance are 
particularly complex. Drivdal’s study (2016) is one of the only papers to engage with 
community-scale adaptation in informal settlements in Cape Town. Drivdal’s research (2016) 
found that three main conditions enable community leaders to motivate community-scale 
adaptation: favourable location (for example, on public land not located in a detention pond), 
internal unification in micro-level politics (between community leaders, ward councillors, 
residents), and a supportive external network. With these three conditions, she found that 
communities were more capable of moving from household coping strategies, to CBA 
(Drivdal, 2016).  
2.2.1.5 Adaptation as Transformation 
Some researchers criticise adaptation efforts as promoting a “development as usual’ pathway 
that does not address the underlying social and political structures that feed “modernization-
led economic growth” as the prevailing development paradigm (Eriksen et al., 2015; 
Inderberg et al., 2015; Bassett & Fogelman, 2013; Dodman & Mitlin, 2013; Ireland & 
McKinnon, 2013; Pelling, 2011). Pelling (2011) believes that adaptation is an opportunity for 
radical social and political change that can be seen as transformation, in the sense that it re-
shapes future power relations in society. Transformation is defined as “physical and/or 
qualitative changes in form, structure or meaning-making” (O’Brien, 2012: 670), or as “a 
psycho-social process involving the unleashing of human potential to commit, care and effect 
change for a better life” (Sharma, 2007:4). In the climate change context, the IPCC defines 
transformational adaptation as “adaptation that changes the fundamental attributes of a 
system in response to climate and its effects” (Agard & Schipper, 2014:1758). 
The potential for adaptation to lead to transformation depends on the way in which 
vulnerability to climate change is understood (Pelling, 2011). If vulnerability is viewed as a 
symptom of proximate factors like demographic, physical, or infrastructural stressors, then 
adaptation will be limited to resilient (maintaining status quo) or transitional (incremental 
change) forms of adaptation (Pelling, 2011). However, if vulnerability is understood through 
the lens of political ecological, and “framed as an outcome of wider social processes shaping 
how people see themselves and others, their relationship with the environment and role in 
political processes” then adaptation as transformation becomes possible (Pelling, 2011: 97) . 
Transformational adaptation, in its very nature and goals, is a more challenging ideal to 
achieve than the other forms of adaptation identified by Pelling (2010): adaptation that 




O’Brien (2012: 672) highlights barriers of power, politics, and vested interests which “are 
often ‘invisible’ within systems analyses.” My research aims to use literature from UPE 
(discussed below) to unpack these “invisible” factors at play in adaptation, specifically CBA, 
to lend some insight to the process of adaptation and transformation in the face of climate 
change, starting from the community level.  Soltesova et al. (2014: 217) summarise Dodman 
and Mitlin’s (2011) ideas on the potential for CBA to lead to transformation in the following 
statement: 
If CBA is to make meaningful changes in the prospects of urban households and 
communities to respond to climate change, it needs to engage with a transformative 
agenda that seeks not only to reduce the surface causes of vulnerability, but also to 
address underlying social and political drivers.  
2.2.2 Climate Change Governance  
Termeer et al. (2016: 12) define governance as “the interactions between public and/or 
private actors ultimately aimed at addressing collective issues.” In the context of climate 
change, a wicked problem, traditional governance approaches have been considered 
inadequate (Termeer et al., 2016). The complexities of climate change require particular 
requirements of governance, namely: multi-boundary, -level and -sector comprehensiveness; 
stakeholder diversity; longevity beyond political tenures; and flexibility in the face of 
uncertainty (Fröhlich & Knieling, 2013).  Stakeholder diversity is emphasised by many 
researchers (Chu, Angueloveski & Carmin, 2016; Archer et al., 2014, Fröhlich & Knieling, 
2013; Leck & Simon, 2012) due to the breadth of potential approaches and solutions to tackle 
climate change impacts, and the important niche roles that different stakeholders can play. 
NGOs in particular can be important partners for community communication, raising 
awareness, and advocating for climate change initiatives (Fröhlich & Knieling, 2013).  
Termeer et al. (2016) describe five criteria that together constitute good governance in the 
context of climate change: reflexivity, resilience, responsiveness, revitalisation and rescaling. 
However, in low- and middle-income countries, many urban governments fail to meet these 
criteria, or only meet them for certain groups within the population (Dodman & 
Satterthwaite, 2008).  
2.2.2.1 Governing Urban Informality  
Urban governments have the greatest responsibility for interventions that should reduce the 




informal settlements can complicate governance efforts. The UN Habitat Programme defines 
informal settlements as either “residential areas where a group of housing units has been 
constructed on land to which the occupants have no legal claim, or which they occupy 
illegally” or “unplanned settlements and areas where housing is not in compliance with 
current planning and building regulations (unauthorized housing)” (WHO, n.d,:2). As noted, 
informal areas are often the most at-risk from climate change impacts (Ziervogel et al., 
2016b; Satterthwaite et al., 2007; Douglas, Alam & Maghenda, 2006), and often there is no 
information base for informal areas on environmental hazards and vulnerability 
(Satterthwaite, 2017). The reasons for high levels of informal settlements in urban areas vary. 
Dodman and Satterthwaite (2008:70) cite,  
…institutional legacies from colonial rule and centralisation in post-independence 
governments, the application of inappropriate imported models of urban planning, 
external pressures for dismantling or weakening the state and the refusal of many 
bilateral aid agencies and international non-governmental organisations to work in 
urban areas.  
The high concentration of people, their homes, industries and waste in cities can make urban 
populations particularly vulnerable to disasters, while at the same time, providing for 
economies of scale due to the proximity of infrastructures and services that can reduce 
vulnerabilities (Hardoy, Mitlin & Satterthwaite, 2001). Pro-poor governments can make 
significant changes that reduce vulnerability for low-income groups, particularly if 
governments understand the dynamics that shape hazards and vulnerability, especially “the 
socio-political norms that determine access to opportunity and resources” (Dodman et al., 
2017: 3). However, more research is needed on climate change governance in the African 
context, particularly concerning informality (Ziervogel et al., 2016a). As Sattherwaite et al. 
(2007: vii) observe, “Successful, well-governed cities greatly reduce climate-related risks for 
low-income populations; unsuccessful, badly governed cities do not and may greatly increase 
such risks”.   
2.2.2.2 Multiscalar Adaptation Governance 
Multiscalar governance refers to the interplay and relationships between different actors at 
different levels of government (as well as citizens, private actors and civil society), in 
managing complex policy decisions, such as climate change adaptation (Vedeld et al., 2015). 




invaluable to understanding urban governance in the context of high urbanisation and climate 
change challenges. Chu, Anguelovski and Carmin (2016) explain how stakeholder 
engagement has become increasingly valued in adaptation governance in recognition of the 
uneven impacts of climate change and the differentiation in structural and institutional 
resources to adapt. They cite three main indicators of inclusive urban climate adaptation 
governance: 1) consideration of vulnerable residents’ needs; 2) procedural justice; and 3) just 
adaptation outcomes (Chu, Angueloveski & Carmin, 2016). However, despite the 
understanding that local, context-based engagement generally improves the success of 
adaptation interventions, participatory governance in urban areas is still hindered by poor 
commitment to true participation. According to Vedeld et al. (2015) this stems from an 
incapacity to address the social dimensions of multiscalar governance, such as inequality and 
informality. 
Researchers have also stressed how improvements in multiscalar governance have the 
potential to lead to transformation. Chu, Anguelovski and Carmin (2016) highlight how CBA 
initiatives can be empowered by local government to encourage both social justice and 
adaptive capacity while Wamsler (2016) emphasises the transformational potential of 
collaboration between the state and its citizens on adaptation action. Even further, CBA 
“presents an opportunity for local-level participation in framing adaptation planning and 
activities, with wider transformative potential for urban governance (Archer et al., 2014: 
345). Chu, Angueloveski and Carmin (2016) and Leck and Simon (2012) explain that many 
studies focus on one particular actor’s role in governing climate change, but that less is 
known about the dynamics between multiple levels of actors involved in facilitating 
adaptation. This study will contribute to literature on urban adaptation governance by 
examining how experiences from multiscalar governance in Cape Town can enable or 
undermine CBA in informal settlements, and by extension, transformation.  
2.2.2.3 Everyday Governance 
Everyday governance focuses on the agency of the actors involved in multi-scalar governance 
and how “their practices, rationales, normative orientations, interests and imaginaries as well 
as their relative and contextual power” allow them to influence the implementation of 
policies and practices on the ground (Cornea, Véron & Zimmer, 2017: 2). The concepts 
behind everyday governance are driven by ethnographic studies that empirically investigate 
the logics behind the routine practices of governance actors (Bierschenk & Olivier de Sardan, 




actors such as NGOs, community leaders, municipal councillors, or street-level bureaucrats, 
who are often the most local and influential implementers of urban policy. As it relates to 
UPE, an analysis of everyday governance can help expose complex flows of information and 
influence between governance actors and citizens, as well as “relationships of micropower 
that contribute to the (re-)production of uneven urban spaces” (Cornea, Véron & Zimmer, 
2017: 7).  
Blundo and Le Meur (2009) describe how everyday governance can lead to the emergence of 
new, decentralised and autonomous power structures that contribute to the states’ hegemonic 
project through local grounding. These authors are influenced by the post-colonial 
perspective, which emphasises the lasting governance implications of the colonial 
administration on everyday governance, such as “clientelism, the absence of sanctions, 
impunity and unproductivity of civil servants” (Blundo & Le Meur, 2009: 19). Bierschenk 
and Olivier de Sardan (2014, 42) critique this perspective as failing to engage with analysis of 
these elites “ ‘at work’, nor in their relations with administrative bodies”, or in other words, 
the more informal side of politics. Therefore, these authors encourage “studying informality 
inside the state as well as the gaps between public policies and their implementation or 
between official norms and actual behaviour” (Bierschenk & Olivier de Sardan, 2014: 51). 
This study evokes this perspective in its exploration of the informal practices of everyday 
governance that are realized in the gap between policy and practice in order to better 
understand the dynamics behind flood management in Cape Town. 
2.3 Theoretical Framework 
While the literature review positions this study within the relevant academic context, the 
theoretical framework provides the structural vision and blueprint for engagement with both 
the literature review and the data collected. This study uses UPE as the theoretical framework 
due to its normative positioning on inequality and justice and its interrogation of mainstream 
environmental change narratives (explained below). Soltesova et al. (2014: 215) explain how 
UPE can help understand CBA: 
Urban CBA is well suited to engage with urban political ecology to identify entry 
points likely to alleviate imbalances of urban systems. In responding to uneven urban 
development, it has the potential to act as a bridge between local, often informal, 
arrangements and formal institutions structuring urban development. Enquiring into 




cities, but also draws attention to the socio- political and historical context of urban 
development as pertinent to specific local communities. 
Because of its inquisitive nature and focus on the less visible drivers of urban vulnerability, 
UPE is well-suited to interrogate CBA as a potential strategy leading to transformation. The 
following section explains the main ideas and theories of UPE along with its related and 
supporting theories on urbanism and decolonisation. 
2.3.1 Urban Political Ecology (UPE) 
UPE theory emerged in the context of resurging Marxist thought and widespread 
environmental activism in the 1960’s and 1970’s as a reaction to the apolitical content of 
cultural ecology and hazard studies (Bridge, McCarthy & Perreault, 2015). UPE departs from 
a normative position of an unequal and unjust world, the result of an unsustainable 
metabolism between humans and the production of nature established by the capitalist global 
system (Castree, 2015; Smith, 2009; Heynen, Swyngedouw & Kaika, 2006). It aims to 
understand the dynamics and forces behind environmental change in order to advance a 
political agenda of structural advancements away from market-based, techno-managerial 
solutions that serve the interests of those in power (Bridge, McCarthy & Perreault, 2015; 
Swyngedouw & Kaika, 2014; Robbins, 2012). 
As a radical political project, UPE is inherently concerned with social justice, but takes a 
different approach than many of the environmental justice movements of the modern day. 
Mobilisation around environmental justice is typically related to distributional injustices 
(Cook & Swyngedouw, 2012), such as the “uneven distribution of both environmental 
benefits and damages [externalities] to economically/politically marginalised people” 
(Heynen, Swyngedouw & Kaika, 2006:9), particularly regarding human health (Hollifield, 
2015). UPE, in contrast, takes a historical-materialist point of view concerning the systematic 
processes that lead to distributional injustices (Cook & Swyngedouw, 2012; Heynen, 
Swyngedouw & Kaika, 2006).  
2.3.1.1 Situated UPE 
Traditional UPE studies proceed from the starting point of Marxist urban geography and the 
notion of power via capital accumulation, followed by examining non-human, networked 
actors to analyse material flows and metabolic processes that shape the city, and finally by 
“critiquing capitalism, commodification, modernity and neoliberalism”(Lawhon, Ernston & 




and Silver (2014:498) claim that this type of global North application of UPE, “tends to 
overlook the situated understandings of the environment, knowledge and power that form the 
core of other political ecological understandings.” In order to tap into these situated 
understandings and knowledge, Lawhon, Ernston and Silver (2014) suggest a new “situated 
UPE” that draws from post-structuralism, including feminist approaches to gendered 
inequalities, post-colonial thinking from South Asia (ethnography-focused), and wider 
currents of Marxism, such as cultural Marxism and postcolonial studies. Derickson’s (2015) 
explanation of “urbanization 2” mirrors Lawhon, Ernston and Silver’s ideas for a more 
heterogenous UPE by borrowing from the intellectual traditions of post-colonial, feminist, 
and neo-Marxist theory, as well as post-structural epistemologies. 
Lawhon, Ernston and Silver (2014) use African Urbanism to develop an approach for 
situating UPE that includes starting with an analysis of everyday practices, understanding 
power dynamics outside of just class, and rather than solely critiquing the capitalism system, 
focusing on the small perturbations of everyday life that can have incremental positive 
impacts for the urban poor. According to Lawhon, Ernston and Silver (2014), the narrative of 
capitalist notions of power has limitations in African cities as state and capital are not the 
only forces shaping African cities and their residents. Thus, Pieterse (2008:209) explains how 
a focus on the “everyday” inverts the top-down starting point of capitalist power to a bottom-
up concept based on how the urban poor use everyday practices to “appropriate the city for 
their own ends.” This appropriation includes making relationships, securing work and a sense 
of self, and network scaling to gain opportunities and resources (Lawhon, Ernston & Silver, 
2014; Simone, 2011; Simone, 2004). Outside of capitalist power notions based on class, 
Lawhon, Ernston and Silver (2014) suggest including power dynamics constructed through 
alternative forms of identity, such as race and gender, as well as power exerted through 
hegemonic discourses on knowledge, all of which highlight the diffuse and relational nature 
of power in African cities. Finally, by beginning with a study of the everyday and 
acknowledging alternative modes of power, situated UPE can open up possibilities for 
realistic and pragmatic change, or radical incrementalism, to “reclaim power in incremental 
steps” (Lawhon, Ernston & Silver, 2014: 511) by “securing a certain autonomy” from the 





2.3.1.2 Subaltern Urbanism 
The concept of the “subaltern” was first raised in social theory by Antonio Gramsci, an 
Italian Marxist who used the term to describe any person or group suffering under a 
hegemonic rule that denies them participation in contributing to history and culture (Gramsci, 
1971, cited in Louai, 2011). Gramsci’s goal was to give a voice to the subaltern, who 
otherwise have their history written by the dominant party (Louai, 2011). Guha (1983) 
developed the concept further in his attempts to legitimise the insurgent practices of peasants 
in colonial India, highlighting the distinction between political mobilisations by elites versus 
the subaltern. Spivak (1998), drawing on the struggles of women throughout history, tasks 
intellectuals with making space for the subaltern to “speak”. In the process, she emphasises 
how the voices of the subaltern, particularly women, are not heard because they are always 
represented by those who try to speak on their behalf (Spivak, 1998).   
Roy (2011: 224), concerned with the political agency of the subaltern and disillusioned with 
apocalyptic narratives of the “slum”, uses subaltern urbanism in reference to the subaltern’s 
“terrain of habitation, livelihood and politics.” In an attempt to disrupt how typical urban 
theorists describe megacities, she uses four concepts to express the heterogeneity of the 
subaltern: peripheries, urban informality, zones of exception, and grey spaces (Roy, 2011). 
Sheppard, Leitner and Marianganti (2013: 897) support the non-homogenisation of the 
subaltern that can result from studying cities at a distance, and in line with situated UPE, 
stress the importance of studies that “privilege everyday lived urban life” and “the tactics of 
survival and subversion resorted to by subaltern or subordinated populations.”  
Holston (2009) characterises the political action taken by those in the periphery as “insurgent 
citizenship.” According to Holston (2009: 246), this insurgency “begins with the struggle for 
the right to have a daily life in the city worthy of a citizen’s dignity” with an end goal of a 
“vast new city…with a different order of citizenship.” Miraftab (2009) introduces the 
concepts of “invited” and “invented” spaces to conceptualise the strategies used by insurgent 
citizens. Invited spaces are those sanctioned and legitimized by governance actors and 
invented spaces are those constructed from below to challenge the status quo (Miraftab, 
2009). These spaces are not mutually exclusive, and are navigated strategically and with 
fluidity in order to best maximise counter-hegemonic actions (Miraftab, 2009). Another 
strategy utilised by the subaltern is insurgent planning, which “aims at decolonizing the 
planning imagination by taking a fresh look at subaltern cities to understand them by their 




the West” (Miraftab, 2009: 45). In this way, marginalised people become the “protagonists of 
urban development” in an attempt to appropriate space and power in a movement towards 
liberation (Miraftab, 2009).  
2.3.1.3 Decolonial Theory  
Questions of power and politics are imperative in UPE, which draws parallels to decolonial 
theory. Decolonial theory, which started in South America and has taken hold in Africa, 
challenges the “insularity of historical narratives and historiographical traditions emanating 
from Europe” (Bhambra, 2014: 115). It seeks to liberate colonized locales from the false 
universalisms and reproduced hierarchies of race, gender and geopolitics that the Euro-North 
American colonial project forced upon the colonized in the name of “modernity” (Ndlovu-
Gatsheni, 2015; Bhambra, 2014; Nelson, 2007). As it relates to UPE in particular, decolonial 
theory contests patterns of knowledge creation and dissemination that place European 
epistemology at the top of the hierarchy, allowing Euro-American scholars to pass off 
subjective universalisms onto the rest of the world under a guise of legitimacy (Mignolo, 
2009). 
Decolonisation and the crisis of the global North homogenising experiences in the global 
South is one that directly relates to adaptation, development and governance. In terms of 
environmental change, Robbins (2012:19) problematizes the assertion that “superior 
environmental knowledge originates in the global north for transfer to the global south” as it 
reproduces “paternalistic colonial knowledge relations and a priori discounting [of] the 
environmental practices of indigenous and local communities”. Further, governmental 
planning systems in Africa are artefacts from colonial days and international development 
agencies enforce models based on false, homogenising assumptions of localities (Broto, 
2014; Parnell, Pieterse & Watson, 2009). In this way, climate change has opened up new 
opportunities for international actors to deploy adaptation interventions (interwoven with 
power dynamics) that reinforce the global, capitalist system. Ground-up initiatives represent 
an alternative to the colonial hierarchy that has led to “the dominance of international elites 
of academics, finance experts and consultants in climate change debates at the local level” 
(Broto, 2014:262). However, local interventions also risk being captured by outside interests, 
be it government, NGO, or international organisations. Dodman & Mitlin (2013:642) explain 





In analysing CBA in urban, informal areas, UPE offers a particular interrogation of risk, 
adaptation and change that provides an opening for transformation to become a reality, rather 
than adapting to the status quo. Pelling (2010: 69) explains how the “promotion of 
stakeholder participation in decision-making” can lead to transformational change through 
the “inclusion of new perspectives and values in emerging policy.” It is therefore important to 
understand the extent and nature of participation in CBA. In the context of dynamic informal 
settlements, multi-scalar governance and everyday governance are appropriate lenses through 
which to understand participation, engagement and implementation across scales, as they 
offer insight into the CoCT’s influence in informal settlements and how informal settlement 
residents in turn influence the process. This study fills certain literature gaps related to urban, 
informal CBA and urban climate change governance with the goal of using situated UPE to 
understand how multiscalar governance can either enable or undermine the potential for true, 





3 Historical and Political Economic Context 
3.1 Introduction 
UPE is not only the theoretical framework for analysis, but also the methodological approach 
and framing of this study. Soltesova et al. (2014: 217) explain, “A political ecology approach 
provides a strong theoretical basis for understanding the complex processes that are 
constantly being negotiated within the context of the urban environment.” As explained by 
Bryant & Bailey (1997) in their book, Third World Political Ecology, this theoretical basis 
comes from a normative understanding that these complex processes are, for the most part, a 
result of the historical global spread of capitalism into the developing world during 
colonialism. In some cases, the state also influences the uneven socioeconomic structures 
further due to a political leader’s personal interest in power, security or self-enrichment 
(Bryant & Bailey, 1997). Environmental ‘goods’ and ‘bads’ then mirror these uneven 
socioeconomic conditions (Soltesova et al., 2014; Bryant & Bailey, 1997), meaning that 
“addressing environmental problems requires engaging with their ultimate rather than 
proximate causes” (Soltesova et al., 2014: 217). Since addressing environmental problems 
can threaten the power of dominant political groups, actors across different scales must work 
in synergy to effect change (Bryant & Bailey, 1997). This understanding of environmental 
problems and their wider political drivers will be used as the starting point to analyse flood 
risk management in this study. This chapter provides the context to the normative UPE 
approach taken in this study. First, the historical and political factors that influence flooding 
in Cape Town’s informal settlements are explained, followed by an overview of the relevant 
regulatory context (environmental and housing) that also significantly influence vulnerability 
to flooding. Finally, wider political economc factors that are beyond the scope of this thesis, 
but still influential, such as global capitalism and South Africa’s political agenda, are briefly 
described.  
3.2 Historical and Political Context  
As mentioned above, political ecology as a theoretical framework attempts to uncover and 
understand the hidden dynamics leading to environmental change, such as historical, 
political, social, epistemological and economic factors. Due to the time and resource 
limitations on this research project, each of these factors cannot be explored in depth. 




Africa, it is important to understand certain of these factors to frame the problem related to 
flooding in informal settlements, described above. The proliferation of informal settlements 
in South Africa stems from two processes, in-migration from the former homelands and 
gentrification. 
After the Union of South Africa was established in 1910, the Government of South Africa 
began heavily restricting access to land for black South Africans (Hoffman, 1999). The Land 
Act of 1913 and the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 limited black South Africans to only 
13.7 percent of the national territory (Hoffman, 1999). In total, ten homelands, or 
“Bantustans”, were created based on ethnic background (i.e., those of Zulu origin were 
assigned to the homeland of KwaZulu): Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Cisekei, Venda, 
Gazankulu, KaNgwane, KwaNdebele, KwaZulu, Lebowa, and Qwa Qwa (The Homelands, 
2011). As one of the main strategies of Apartheid spatial planning, the goal of the Bantustans 
was to make black South Africans citizens of their “homelands” rather than South Africa, so 
that white South Africans could control South Africa. Under the Apartheid government that 
took power in 1948, the Group Areas Act of 1950 gave the government the power to further 
delineate where each racial group could live (Cape Town the Segregated City, 2017). Certain 
neighbourhoods in Cape Town were declared white only, and non-whites were forcibly 
relocated (Cape Town the Segregated City, 2017). Many Africans, Coloreds and Indians were 
relocated to the Cape Flats, some of the most marginal land in the area and several kilometres 
away from the city, giving it the nickname of Apartheid’s “dumping ground”(Cape Town the 
Segregated City, 2017; Joubert, 2014).  
As environmental degradation, unequal access to land and high population density led to 
deteriorating conditions in the Bantustans, the townships in the Cape Flats increasingly 
became a refuge for those escaping the homelands in search of a better life in the city 
(Percival & Homer-Dixon, 1998), a pattern of in-migration that still exists (Joubert, 2014). 
Somewhat paradoxically, the same processes of environmental degradation and inequality 
that drove people from the homelands are now occurring in informal settlements and 
townships surrounding cities, due to similar factors: high population density and a limited 
resources base (Percival & Homer-Dixon, 1998). To begin with, Apartheid spatial planning 
condemned black townships to overcrowded sites with poor service provision, often within 
the sphere of pollution from dirty industries (Percival & Homer-Dixon, 1998). High rates of 
urbanisation combined with a lack of resources have led to removal of vegetation, soil 




housing, water, sanitation, and waste disposal on the periphery of cities (Percival & Homer-
Dixon, 1998). Because many informal settlements are located in flood plains or water 
catchment zones, environmental degradation, particularly the removal of vegetation, also 
increases the risks of negative impacts from environmental hazards like floods, mud slides, 
and sinkholes (Lawson, 1991). 
In addition to in-migration from rural areas, gentrification works in the opposing direction, 
forcing low-income residents further and further from the city centre.  While Apartheid 
spatial planning did this legally, gentrification is mirroring these processes in a class-based, 
rather than race-based mechanism (Visser & Kotze, 2008). Harvey (2008) calls this 
“accumulation by dispossession”, referring to the process by which cities become the centre 
of a consumer culture that increases the value of land, leading to dispossession and forced 
removals where low-income populations are pushed to the periphery. In Cape Town, the 
development of the Central Business District “was achieved through planning frameworks 
that are linked to political structures that aim to position the city within a neo-liberal, global 
economy” (Visser & Kotze, 2008: 2572). In this way, the city’s economic priorities have 
favoured the negative implications of this development for the urban poor. More recently, a 
new phenomenon is taking place whereby gentrification, known as “state-led suburban 
gentrification”, is occurring in the townships as well (Visser & Kotze, 2008: 2587). While on 
one hand, there are benefits to bringing services and shops closer to the urban poor, it also 
leads to the same issues of displacement and exclusion of the poorest that exist in the centre 
of the city (Visser & Kotze, 2008: 2587). Cape Town’s residents are protesting the lack of 
affordable housing, drawing on the similarities between Apartheid spatial planning and 
patterns of gentrification (McCool, 2017).  
South Africa is still considered extremely unequal, with a Gini coefficient of .655 in 2014 
(World Bank, 2018). Inequality is highly differentiated by race, whereas poverty estimates 
for Black and Coloured population groups are 63 percent and 40 percent respectively, 
compared to Whites (6 percent) and Indians (16 percent) (David et al., 2018). This inequality 
can be seen clearly in the presence and proliferation of informal settlements, which can be 
directly linked to Apartheid spatial planning and patterns of gentrification occurring 
thereafter. This makes the resolution of environmental issues in informal settlements, such as 
                                                 
5 The Gini coefficient measures income inequality based on wealth distribution of a country’s residents. Zero 




flooding, not only a matter of physical and geographical security from environmental 
hazards, but of justice for historical and continued wrongdoings.   
3.3 Regulatory Context  
In South Africa, government is divided into three tiers: National government, which dictates 
laws and policies; Provincial Government, which dictates provincial legislation and shares 
responsibilities with national government in terms of health, education and social services; 
and local government, which provides basic services and promotes safety, health, and 
community development (Know your Government. 2017). Local government is further 
divided into three different categorizations of municipalities: metropolitan, district and local, 
dating back to the Local Government: Municipal Demarcation Act 27 of 1998 (Leck & 
Simon, 2013). Cape Town, as a major city, falls under the “metropolitan” municipality 
category, which denotes a high level of functional independence to the mayoral executive 
council (Municipalities in the Western Cape, n.d.).  The Cape Town municipality is further 
divided into 116 wards, which are groups of neighbourhoods that are clustered together to 
make service delivery more manageable (City of Cape Town, 2017b).  
3.3.1 Environmental Management and Risk  
South Africa’s 1996 constitution, along with several other acts, form the regulatory 
framework surrounding environmental management and environmental risk in South Africa 
and its provinces and municipalities. South Africa’s Bill of Rights in the constitution 
specifically details: 
Everyone has the right to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-
being; and to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future 
generations, through reasonable legislative and other measures that prevent pollution 
and ecological degradation; promote conservation; and secure ecologically sustainable 
development and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable economic and 
social development (Republic of South Africa, 1996).   
The National Environmental Management Act (NEMA) is the embodiment of this 
constitutional right. NEMA sets out the practicalities of managing the environment, including 
principles, procedures, cooperation, decision-making, international obligations, compliance 
and enforcement (Republic of South Africa, 1998). Importantly, the act recognises that 




factors” (Republic of South Africa, 1998:3). In terms of environmental risk, South Africa’s 
Disaster Management Act (DRM, original 2002, amended 2015) addresses the prevention, 
reduction, mitigation and response to disasters (Republic of South Africa, 2002).   
At the International Level, South Africa is party to the Kyoto Protocol and the UNFCCC, 
under which the Paris Agreement was ratified in 2016. As the strongest international climate 
change strategy to date, the Paris Agreement’s goal is to keep global temperatures from 
increasing 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels (The Paris Agreement, n.d.). To this 
end, party countries are required to meet certain reporting deadlines that detail their 
mitigation and adaptation strategies, particularly around GHG emissions reduction. In 
response to its international commitments, South Africa has strategic documents to address 
climate change and development concerns, such as the National Climate Change Response 
White Paper6 and the Long Term Adaptation Scenarios (LTAS)7. Both strategies highlight 
the specific nature of climate change vulnerability in informal settlements, and emphasise the 
importance of adaptation responses.  While at the provincial level, the Western Cape Climate 
Change Response Strategy solely mentions “improving the resilience and adaptive capacity 
of informal settlements” (Western Cape Government, 2014: 33), the LTAS highlights the 
importance of informal settlements upgrading, relocation, and reblocking as integral to 
reducing environmental risks (Department of Environmental Affairs, 2014). 
Between national, provincial and local government strategy, disconnects exist that highlight a 
broader issue of integration and coordination between the different tiers of government 
(vertical), as well as between departments within the same government level (horizontal). For 
example, while national policy mandates that municipal level governments address climate 
change adaptation, there is no funding at the municipal level to enact this mandate (Ziervogel 
et al., 2014). While NEMA and the DRM act are full of references to collaboration, 
cooperation, harmonisation, and consistency, practice has shown that it is not as simple as the 
legislation indicates. Leck & Simon (2013: 1226) demonstrate “a distinct weakness in 
vertical managerial and administrative interaction and a lack of formal and functioning 
procedures, regulations and guidelines for addressing EC [environmental change]-related 
issues between governmental spheres.” This is especially prevalent in environmental change 
                                                 
6 See the National Climate Change Response White Paper here: 
https://www.environment.gov.za/sites/default/files/legislations/national_climatechange_response_whitepaper.pd
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governance, as different parties interpret the severity of environmental change differently, 
and therefore prioritise environmental management according to their own perspectives (Leck 
& Simon, 2013). Further, the dominant development paradigm pits economic development 
and environmental management as trade-offs, a mind-set prevalent in all levels of 
government (Leck & Simon, 2013).  
3.3.2 Human Settlements and Housing  
South Africa’s 1996 constitution is the basis for all housing policy in the country. The Bill of 
Rights in the constitution states the following: 
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing. 
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right.  
(3) No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without 
an order of court made after considering all of the relevant circumstances. No 
legislation may permit arbitrary evictions. (Republic of South Africa, 1996).  
The 1997 Housing Act and the National Housing Code set out how the government can fulfil 
the constitutional housing commitments to its citizens (Republic of South Africa, 1997). 
Since 1994, the post-Apartheid government had already been implementing the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) housing policy. Although this policy 
attempted to rectify the shelter crisis the new government inherited, it never managed to 
provide enough houses to meet supply (Siame, 2013). The RDP programme is also criticised 
for its unsustainability and inadequate public service provision that incited many protests 
(Siame, 2013). The Breaking New Ground (BNG) housing policy of 2004 is the successor to 
the RDP policy. The BNG aims to deliver a more diverse range of possibilities for housings 
and settlements, and in line with the Millennium Development Goal of improving the lives of 
those in informal settlements, BNG aims to in-situ upgrade or relocate informal settlements 
through the Upgrading Informal Settlements Programme (UISP) (Siame, 2013).  
The UISP uses a holistic approach that favours community participation, prioritises service 
delivery and discourages irrational relocations (Siame, 2013). It consists of four phases: 1) 
application, where municipalities apply for funding for upgrading;  2) project initiation, 
where the municipality acquires land, profiles the settlement, installs services, conducts 




of infrastructure and facilities, establishing support services and formalising land rights; and 
4) housing consolidation, where the township is finalised, owners are registered and houses 
are constructed (National Upgrading Support Programme, 2015). Critics of UISP claim 
community participation is ineffective because of controversial ward committee politics 
(Siame, 2013). Further, they argue that UISP fails to resolve the dichotomy between housing 
being an individual/family need (where the housing waiting list is based on households) and 
settlement upgrading as a communal project (Siame, 2013). Siame (2013) discusses the 
limitations of the BNG due to the government’s neo-liberal macro-economic policies that 
reinforce the growing gap between the rich and the poor, making the UISP unsustainable. 
3.4 Political Economy Implications  
The majority of the challenges and practicalities faced by the actors involved in the flood 
management landscape relate directly to the particularities of Cape Town’s multi-scalar 
governance network. However, many of the challenged identified in the data also relate to 
wider, structural issues beyond the scope of this study. The role of global and national-level 
political economic structures in influencing local level challenges is undeniable. Some of 
these broader political economic factors that influence flood risk are alluded to above, such as 
urbanisation and constraining national- level regulations. 
Multiple CoCT officials expressed the challenge of keeping up with service provision and 
private land protection due to high amounts of people moving from the Eastern Cape to Cape 
Town in search of jobs (Interview 7; Interview 8). This urbanisation is the main contributing 
factor of density in informal settlements (Interview 7). Urbanisation cannot be discussed 
without reference to the influencing driver of capitalism. Harvey (2008) describes how 
capitalist debt-financing led to cities becoming the centres of consumerism.  The elite control 
the surplus value of labour and capital in cities, which means they can decide how it is 
reinvested, and therefore control the development of the city (Harvey, 2008). Democratic 
control over this surplus value would help ordinary people drive the city’s development 
agenda (Harvey, 2008). However, capitalism is now a global phenomenon, and cities play a 
central role (Harvey, 2008). Changing the control of surplus value is thus no small 
endeavour.  
Another important factor influencing flood risk from above is the Government of South 
Africa’s political agenda.  As noted directly above, Apartheid spatial planning allocated black 




Africa has grappled with policies of land reform to resolve this injustice.  However, critics 
have cited the following weaknesses in the Government’s land reform policy: 
Slow pace of land redistribution; failure to impact significantly on the land 
tenure systems prevailing on commercial farms and in the communal areas; 
and perceptions that what redistribution of land has taken place has not been 
translated into improvements in agricultural productivity or livelihood benefits 
for the majority of participants (Lahiff, 2008: 1). 
Recently (2018), South Africa’s ruling party, the African National Congress, supported a 
motion tabled by the Economic Freedom Fighters to expropriate land without compensation 
(Thambo, 2018). Many of the subjects interviewed cited lack of housing and by connection, 
lack of land, as a major factor influencing their ability to better manage flood risk in informal 
settlements. Therefore, the results of the national debate around land reform will be highly 
influential at local levels, particularly in regard to informal settlements, where those settled 
on private land have limited options for receiving municipal services.  
3.5 Conclusion  
As explained above, the historical, regulatory, and political economic environment all have 
significant influence on the current nature of flooding and vulnerability in Cape Town’s 
informal settlements. While the focus of this thesis is primarily the micro-level network 
involved in managing flood risk in informal settlements, it is important to understand these 
inherent drivers that continue to influence vulnerability at a more macro-level. The UPE 
approach uses these factors as both a normative starting point and framing of this analysis in 
order to express how vulnerability is more than just the physical factors in the urban 
environment, but “complex processes that are constantly being negotiated” (Soltesova et al., 





4 Methodology  
4.1 Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a detailed explanation of the methodology of this 
thesis. The chapter begins with a justification for the methodology selected, followed by a 
description of the ISN case study. Next, the data collection methods (document review and 
semi-structured interviews) are outlined, as well as the data anlysis process. The chapter 
concludes with an explanation of the limitations of thes thesis and the ethical considerations 
of the research process.  
4.2 Justification  
In order to meet the research aim of understanding CBA to flood risk in informal settlements 
through a UPE lens, a case study approach was taken that utilised document review and semi-
structured interviews. The case study allowed for the most extensive UPE analysis possible 
within the time and resource constraints of this thesis. By focusing on a single network of 
actors and the challenges they face (flooding in informal settlements), I was able to unravel 
some of the more nuanced, dynamic, and intricate factors involved in flood risk management 
that would not have been possible had I engaged with a broader scope for this research. Even 
within the narrow scope of a case study, there were still limits to the extent of UPE analysis I 
was able to undertake (see limitations below), such as examining differentiated risk in 
communities. Therefore, the methodological goal of this thesis was to provide an in-depth 
UPE analysis at a small-scale that could talk to some of the challenges to adaptation and 
transformation at-large.  
To meet the research aim and objectives (identified in chapter 1), it was vital to have a 
comprehensive understanding of the perspectives of the actors involved, as well as their 
relationships and experiences. While document review helped to provide the necessary 
historical, political, regulatory and economic context (see previous section, chapter 3) that is 
crucial in an UPE approach, semi-structured interviews with the different actors involved 
helped to uncover the processes, perspectives, and power dynamics that ultimately determine 
the potential for CBA to lead to transformation. While other theoretical frameworks might 
have provided more insight into the networks or social movements involved in this case 




and nuanced approach to analysing such a complex situation, particularly with UPE’s focus 
on environmental and urban challenges.      
4.3 Case Study Description 
This project will focus on a case study of the community-based organisation, ISN. ISN is “a 
bottom-up agglomeration of settlement-level and national-level organisations of the urban 
poor”, and is a local affiliate of the global NGO, Shack/Slum Dwellers International (SDI) 
(SDI Alliance, 2012a). ISN’s main objectives are as follows: 
• Create solidarity and unity of the urban poor so that they are well organised, and 
equipped with the skills, knowledge and scale needed to create meaningful change 
• Building a national urban network of the poor for learning and lobbying so that local, 
community-level initiatives drive any citywide or national agenda, city governments 
are obliged to consult communities in development plans, and communities develop 
the capacity to hold local authorities, especially at ward council level, to account 
• Change the way our cities are planned and developed and how public funds are used 
so that they are inclusive, and that ordinary people are involved (SDI South African 
Alliance, 2012a).  
One of the issues ISN has been working on is flood response in informal settlements. Some 
of the activities they engage in are mapping of water pipes and flood prone areas, organising 
drainage digging, collaborating with street committees around flooding issues, contacting 
CoCT officials to secure services during flood events, lobbying for improved services from 
the CoCT, and consulting with ward councillors8.  
Per Ritchie & Lewis (2003), a case study approach uses multiple perspectives to gain a 
comprehensive understanding of a particular context. Thus, in order to understand ISN’s 
specific role, ISN members were interviewed, along with the NGO, ward, and municipal 
authorities they work with. The case study examined how these actors are interlinked and 
how they work together to manage and govern flood risk in the informal settlements that ISN 
works in. The NGO, while it will remain anonymous, acts as a community support and 
capacitating mechanism for ISN, as well as a link between the community and the municipal 
authorities. Ward councillors, elected every five years, also act as a link between 
communities and municipal government (City of Cape Town, 2017b). As the political leader 
                                                 




of the ward, councillors are the chairperson of the ward committee, which helps identify the 
priorities of their constituents and decide how to allocate funding to development projects in 
the ward (City of Cape Town, 2017b).  
The CoCT has various departments that work in informal settlements (see Figure 2), but the 
main departments that are relevant to managing flood risk are DRM (within Disaster 
Management & Public Emergency Communications Centre), Informal Network Management 
(INM), Informal Settlements and Backyarders (ISB), and indirectly, Water and Sanitation, 
Solid Waste Management, City Health, and Recreation & Parks. DRM plays a coordination 
role within the CoCT in response to flooding in informal settlements. They assess flooding 
risk, and make requests of the relevant CoCT departments to address those risks (Interview 
7). INM is responsible for ensuring that municipal service providers can access informal 
settlements, and they also manage roads and stormwater management (Interview 1). ISB 
mainly deals with monitoring and surveying informal settlements, as well as with housing 
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infrastructure in informal settlements such as toilets and taps (Interview 12), and waste 
management is responsible for collecting rubbish from communities in informal settlements 
and providing cleaning services (Solid Waste Management Department, n.d.). During my 
fieldwork, I was able to interview CoCT officials working in INM, ISB, DRM, and Water 
and Sanitation. 
4.4 Data Collection 
4.4.1 Document Review 
Document review was used as a supplemental data collection methodology to complement 
semi-structured interviews. The document review primarily informed the background, 
problem statement, and context sections of this study. As Ritchie & Lewis (2003: 35) explain, 
“Documentary analysis is particularly useful where the history of events or experiences has 
relevance” or “when situations or events cannot be investigated by direct observation or 
questioning.” In the case of flooding in informal settlements, particularly from an UPE 
perspective, historical events are vital to understanding the problem statement in context. 
Further, not all of the background data could be collected through investigation of primary 
sources. Thus, this study used existing documents to understand the problem of flooding in 
informal settlements, as well as the historical, political, and regulatory context that shaped the 
nature of this problem.  
4.4.2 Semi-structured Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted as the main data collection methodology. 
Interviewees were chosen through a combination of three types of sampling: Criterion-based, 
convenience, and opportunistic. Criterion-based sampling was the primary strategy used, as I 
needed interview subjects in each of the different categories of actors who manage flood risk 
in informal settlements: ISN members, CoCT employees, Ward Councillors, and NGO staff.  
In criterion-based sampling, interviewees “are chosen because they have particular features or 
characteristics which will enable detailed exploration and understanding of the central themes 
and puzzles which the researcher wishes to study” (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003: 78). Thus, 
affiliation was the main criterion for sampling interview subjects. Within the different 
affiliations, convenience sampling, or sampling according to ease-of-access (Ritchie & 
Lewis, 2003) was used as the next sampling strategy. I was connected to individuals at the 
NGO and at the CoCT mainly through my supervisor’s network. NGO employees then 




& Lewis, 2003) was used primarily to identify ward councillors to interview. Opportunistic 
sampling allows the researcher to take advantage of opportunities as they arise to identify 
interview subjects (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003). As I wanted to interview ward councillors with 
experience working with ISN around flooding issues, I asked the ISN members I interviewed 
to identify ward councillors within their communities.  
The interviews were designed to be semi-structured to allow for flexibility and for 
conversations to flow more naturally towards the interviewee’s areas of expertise. Rather 
than ask solely specific, rigid questions, interviewees were first prompted to tell stories about 
their own experiences related to different topics that were relevant to the research (See 
Appendix 1). The specific interview questions, designed to be open-ended, were used to fill 
in any gaps that were not covered by the narrative.  Interview guides were used to ensure 
consistency across the data collected to allow for more meaningful data analysis.  Ritchie & 
Lewis (2003: 115) explain that interview guides help steer the conversation “to ensure that 
relevant issues are covered systematically and with some uniformity, while still allowing 
flexibility to pursue the detail that is salient to each individual participant.”  
Interviews were mainly conducted in the interviewee’s office. ISN member’s interviews were 
conducted at their home, at a community centre, and at a coffee shop. The interviews ranged 
in length between 30 minutes and 1 hour 15 minutes. Besides the interview with the NGO, 
which was a group interview due to their limited availability, every interview was with an 
individual. First, the consent form was presented along with a verbal explanation of the 
research and research process. Interviews were recorded after receiving verbal consent, so 
that the researcher could engage fully in the conversation without needing to take copious 
notes. Interviews were transcribed immediately after completion of the interview, so that the 
material was fresh in the researcher’s mind, and to make the transcription process as easy as 
possible. 
4.5 Data Analysis  
A thematic analysis was used to analyse data from the methods outlined above. The interview 
questions were designed to understand the dynamics surrounding flood risk and the politics 
and power balances imbedded in the relationships between the actors involved in flood 





• Roles and responsibilities of interviewees, and how they came to be in their current 
positions 
• Processes of decision-making 
• Challenges and opportunities in collaborating with the different case study groups 
(community-based organisation, NGO, ward councillors and CoCT) 
• Opinions on the effectiveness of policies and procedures related to flood risk 
• Level of community involvement in governing flood risk  
• Reasons for changes in flood governance over time 
The following steps, outlined by Braun & Clarke (2006), were used, to conduct a thematic 
analysis of the data: 
1. Familiarisation with the data, including transcription 
2. Generate initial codes  
3. Search for themes 
4. Review themes 
5. Define and name themes 
6. Interpretive analysis and write-up 
The data was interpreted using an inductive process (i.e., data-driven) (Braun & Clarke, 
2006), but through the theoretical lens of UPE which has a focus on power and politics. 
Themes were identified at the semantic (explicit) level from a constructionist perspective, 
which “seeks to theorise the socio-cultural contexts, and structural conditions, that enable the 
individual accounts that are provided” (Braun & Clarke, 2006: 14). The themes are presented 
and discussed in relation to the literature in chapters 5 and 6.  
4.6 Limitations 
As this research is based on a single case study, the results cannot apply to other scenarios. 
Within the single case study, and due to the length and time constraints on this research 
project, only a few main actors were interviewed. Critiques of case study approaches include 
the inability to generalize and verification bias (Flyvbjerg, 2006). The results from a single 
case study approach can therefore not be useful in influencing policy. Further, given the 
length and time constraints on this research project, a differentiated analysis of flood 
vulnerability in informal settlements was not possible. This limitation is important to note 




and ability, which has implications for development practitioners and policy makers. In 
recognising these critiques, the goal of this study is to contribute to the literature around 
multi-scalar governance and CBA in urban, informal areas, acknowledging that further 
research still needs to be done, using diverse and differentiated research methods.  
Researcher bias is another limitation inherent in qualitative research studies. Interviewer bias 
can be expressed throughout the research process and includes preconceived notions about 
results, favouring data that supports the researcher’s theory or implicitly legitimising a certain 
category of actors over another (Colarusso, 2016). Further, interview subjects can also 
express bias. For example, CoCT officials may have tailored their responses due to their 
responsibilities and loyalties to the City.  
4.7 Ethical Considerations  
I have abided by the department and university policy by filling out the required ethics forms. 
Additionally, I asked permission of the NGO and ISN before conducting research in their 
communities and made the nature of my research clear to study participants. Interviewees 
were informed that their participation was voluntary and anonymous, and they signed consent 
forms (see appendix 9.3). Interviewees are only identified by their organisation, and their 
names and other personally identifying information are not used. I will report back to the 
communities, NGO, ward councillors and municipality on the results, and of any knowledge 
that might be of value to them in their adaptation work. 
4.7.1 Researcher’s Positionality 
As explained by Neely and Nguse (2015: 142) “…knowledge is shaped by the people and 
places involved in its creation; in order to fully render that knowledge, we must reflect on our 
position and how it shapes our research.” Throughout the research process, I reflected on how 
my positionality as a white, American, female University of Cape Town student could impact 
data collection and relationships with community leaders. For the aspects of my positionality 
that are not clear at first glance, I tried to make these clear to my interviewees (i.e., my 
background and nature of my work). I tried to find common ground with community leaders 
to reduce the binary between “researcher” and “researched” (Neely & Nguse, 2015: 145). I 
aimed to make community leaders as comfortable as possible by conducting interviews in 
locations that were convenient and familiar to them- such as their home, neighbourhood 
community center or NGO’s office. I also considered how my own values and biases have the 




neutral stance and represent interviewee’s opinions exactly as they were intended – often 
using direct quotes to do so. For issues that were contentious, I tried to present both sides of 
the debate fairly.   
4.8 Conclusion  
This chapter has outlined and justified the research methodology used for analysing the case 
study in this thesis, and provided an explanation of the limitations and ethicial considerations 
involved therein. As explained, the case study was well-suited to the UPE theoretical 
approach because it provided a small network of actors for comprehensive analysis, aided by 
the methodological tools of document review and semi-structured interviews. While the 
limitations and ethical considerations described did not allow for a completely neutral and 
differentiated analysis of the data, the results (described in the next chapter) still allow for an 
improved understanding of the complexities surrounding flood risk in informal settlements in 
Cape Town.  
5 Results 
The semi-structured interview data painted a complex picture of the problem of flooding in 
informal settlements in Cape Town, and of the processes involved to either mitigate or 
respond to floods. This chapter describes the flood management landscape through the roles 
of actors, the challenges they face, and the barriers and realities of multi-scalar governance in 
practice.  
5.1 Actors 
The actors involved in managing flooding in informal settlements play a combination of 
distinct, complementary, and overlapping roles throughout the flood management process. 
Despite a recent power struggle with the Democratic Alliance, the CoCT Mayor, Patricia de 
Lille, (while not a distinct actor identified nor interviewed in this study), sits atop the CoCT 
governmental hierarchy. Mayoral influence was mentioned several times throughout the 
interview process, whereas de Lille was seen as influential in increasing service delivery in 
informal settlements (Interview 5) and even intervening to force the relocation of a settlement 
out of a detention pond (Interview 7). The mayoral committee, consisting of the Mayor and 
10 members of council and four area-based members, has the power to grant decision-making 




holds a certain amount of indirect influence over the flood risk management process 
(Interview 7; City of Cape Town, n.d.). 
Within the CoCT, INM is the main department directly responsible for managing flooding in 
informal settlements. INM’s flood management process consists of three steps: Identification, 
mitigation, and evaluation (Interview 1). First a flood risk assessment is carried out to 
identify informal settlements that are vulnerable to winter flooding (Interview 1). The 
mitigation phase consists of actions taken as part of the Winter Readiness Plan, such as 
maintenance of formal and informal drainage channels in settlements, awareness raising and 
education on coping mechanisms through the Expanded Public Works Programme9 (EPWP), 
and the issuance of weather alerts and warnings (de Lille, 2017). Two types of relief are 
offered: soft relief, where food and blankets are provided and hard relief, which is more 
engineering-based, such as physically digging a trench to drain water out of the area 
(Interview 1). An evaluation is conducted monthly throughout the winter, and is based on the 
level of effort exerted, and where improvements could be made (Interview 1). 
Both INM and DRM play important coordinating roles with the other CoCT departments in 
the process of managing flood risk (see Figure 3). INM’s mandate includes roads and 
stormwater management, and ensuring that informal settlements can be accessed and serviced 
by the CoCT. Therefore, they can dig trenches to drain stormwater and open up spaces in 
informal settlements to allow maintenance crews to work, but any other flood risk reduction 
or response activities that fall outside that mandate are governed by other departments. For 
example, DRM, through the logistics office, provides soft relief (Interview 7), and if a 
settlement needs to be relocated, either the Recreation and Parks department, or ISB would 
need to be involved to identify temporary housing or a piece of land that could accommodate 
residents (Interview 1). Within DRM, disaster risk officers are continuously monitoring risks 
and responding to disasters, such as fires and floods, within their regional jurisdictions 
(Interview 7). If a settlement is particularly vulnerable to flooding, but ISB cannot relocate or 
temporarily house people, DRM will make recommendations to the specific departments 
responsible for addressing the flood risks in that area (Interview 7). For example, if a canal is 
blocked by rubbish, or a platform needs to be built to raise the level of homes above the flood 
line, they will coordinate with INM (Interview 7). If toilets are clogged with rubbish, Solid 
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Waste Management will be asked to run an education and awareness campaign to reduce 
dumping while the water and sanitation department will be called for maintenance (Interview 
7). If the sanitation situation at the toilets is dire enough, City Health will be called to 
intervene (Interview 7). While DRM can make recommendations to the different 
departments, they do not have authority to force action on behalf of the other departments 
(Interview 7).   
The ward councillors’ primary role is elevating the community’s needs, vulnerabilities and 
complaints to the attention of the CoCT. For ward councillors, on a day-to-day basis, this can 
be responding to complaints directly where it is within his/her power, or playing a 
coordinating role, where community members are directed to the relevant department and 
informed about how to register complaints with the CoCT’s online system (Interview 10; 
Interview 11). Complaints registered by a ward councillor, whether online or through 
monthly departmental meetings or sub council meetings, carry more weight (Interview 10; 
Interview 11). Ward councillors also work with communities to identify priority projects to 
be funded by the ward’s budget, and sometimes these projects can reduce flood risk in a 
community, if, for example, they relate to upgrading stormwater infrastructure (Interview 
11). Two of the councillors interviewed were members of committees or portfolios where 
opportunities exist to influence flood risk reduction at a higher level. Depending on the level 
of hands-on involvement the councillor decides to take in his/her ward, they can also 
coordinate with DRM risk officers and identify risks themselves by spending time in their 
communities (Interview 10). Others set up structures or networks themselves within their 
wards, where liaisons act as their eyes and ears on the ground (Interview 6; Interview 11).  
ISN and the NGO work to strategically organise communities to lobby the city for projects 
and services that can reduce flood risk. The NGO helps to organise the profiling, enumeration 
and mapping of informal settlements by ISN members, so that when they make requests of 
the CoCT, the CoCT has all of the information they need to respond to the requests. For 
example, in order to determine how many toilets to provide in an informal settlement at the 
ratio of one toilet to five households, ISN can provide the CoCT with the number of 
households in that informal settlement, and where the toilets should be located. From the 
NGO’s side, their role in working with ISN is not to “spearhead projects or to speak for them 
and do things for them, it’s capacitating to do things for themselves and to take ownership of 
their own development agenda” (Interview 4). Through the process of profiling and 




development interventions (Interview 4). The NGO then helps the community turn these 
ideas into realistic projects, and helps to liaison with the right people in the CoCT to 
implement them. The NGO has some funds to experiment with for more catalytic projects 
that aim to get the attention of the City either to prioritise a certain issue, or to highlight the 
effectiveness of community-designed interventions (Interview 4). For example, ISN members 
spearheaded the first “reblocking” which is now widely recognised as an effective strategy to 
re-organise informal settlements (based on community-drafted spatial designs) to reduce 
density, while creating access for services as well as drainage channels to dispel stormwater 
(Interview 2; Interview 3; Interview 4; Interview 5; Interview 7) . The CoCT even adopted 
reblocking as a policy after seeing the success of the first pilot reblocking project in the 
Mshini Wam informal settlement (Interview 2; Interview 4). The NGO and ISN have become 
specialists in this strategy, and spend much of their time attempting to actuate new reblocking 
efforts (Interview 4).  
 
Figure 3. Relationships amongst actors in the flood management landscape. This diagram shows the most prominent and 
authentic connections amongst actors, but does not represent every connection that exists. 
5.2 Challenges 
Across the flood management landscape, the different actors involved face various challenges 
that complicate the management of flood risk in informal settlements. Similar to McFarlane 
and Silver’s (2017) analysis of different way of “seeing” sanitation issues in Cape Town, this 




issues of flooding in informal settlements. Ways of seeing can encompass “distributions of 
the body, the infrastructural and the sensorial, but in so doing, becomes a question of dignity, 
race, gender, citizenship, history and the prospects of urban social justice” (McFarlane & 
Silver, 2017: 127). The challenges identified by the actors represent their particular 
perception of the relevant issue at hand, and “those particular conceptions lead to different 
forms of politicization,” (McFarlane & Silver, 2017: 128) which in turn shapes the nature of 
the city. For that reason, the below section is divided into two sections: challenges faced by 
the CoCT and challenges faced by ISN.  The politicisation of these perceptions is discussed 
in chapter 6.  
5.2.1 Challenges faced by CoCT 
Many of the challenges faced by the CoCT in trying to reduce flood risk relate to the 
conditions in informal settlements and the nature of their development. Due to the unplanned 
nature of settlements, the CoCT is forced to mostly play catch-up, where they try to provide 
the basic services guaranteed by the constitution once a settlement has already developed. 
The CoCT is obliged to prevent the proliferation of South Africa’s informal settlements, 
particularly when they develop on private land. ISB has to balance the Trespass Act and the 
Prevention of Illegal Eviction (PIE) Act when attempting to prevent illegal land occupation 
(Interview 5). The Trespass Act allows forced eviction within 48 hours of occupants setting 
up a structure (Cupido & Hartley, 2010). After that, the PIE Act is activated, which requires a 
formal court order to evict occupants (Interview 5). The anti-land invasion team tries to 
monitor the construction of new structures, but there are not enough staff to ensure that 
structures are removed within 48 hours, after which the eviction process becomes much 
longer, allowing settlements to grow (Interview 5). A CoCT official explained: 
People know by now that officials are working from 8 until 4:30 or 5:00…people are 
so desperate that they will even build at night…if they are there now for 48 hours or 
longer, than you cannot really come and carry out this stuff [eviction] or you will at 
the end go and maybe have to explain yourself in court (Interview 5). 
Once settlements are established, the CoCT is obligated to provide basic services. However, 
often the shacks are so close together that the CoCT cannot find access routes for service 
vehicles, nor can they identify locations to place toilets or taps (Interview 2; Interview 4; 
Interview 5; Interview 6; Interview 8; Interview 10). When settlements are on private land, 




“Land rights should always be respected”, so providing services on private land equates to 
“eroding the rights of the landowner” (Interview 1). In some cases, the CoCT can provide 
temporary facilities (Interview 12), or can provide services on municipal roads that border the 
settlements located on private land (Interview 1), but options are extremely limited.  
Once the CoCT has provided basic services in an informal settlement (to whichever extent 
possible), maintaining those services becomes a major challenge because of dumping and 
vandalism, which exacerbate flooding issues. As mentioned above, dumping (leaving rubbish 
in unsanctioned areas) is a major problem because it clogs toilets, sewage, and stormwater 
drains which results in flooding, and it also creates unpleasant living conditions in informal 
settlements (Interview 7; Interview 11). One ISN leader explained “They only built the piping 
system that would accommodate those number of people that were living here before. Since 
now the number has grown, now the pressure onto the pipe is not enough to contain” 
(Interview 2). While community members blame overcrowding, poor waste management, and 
the need for infrastructural upgrades (Interview 2), the CoCT believes dumping is more of a 
social issue requiring behaviour change interventions (Interview 8; Interview 12). One CoCT 
official was shocked to see the difference in cleanliness between villages where he used to 
work in the Eastern Cape (where many residents of informal settlements immigrate from), 
and the amount of rubbish in informal settlements (Interview 8). He/she had an explanation 
for dumping that came from a friend of his/hers living in an informal settlement: “His 
deduction is that if you are exploited, by government, or by a political party, or by your ward 
council or whatever, it’s easy to exploit your fellow human being…But it’s not something 
you can legislate…It’s a mindset” (Interview 8). This “mindset” of indifference or 
exploitation of others in response to exploitation relates to the issue of vandalism, which can 
be more directly related to civil unrest, and potentially criminal activity. In one instance, the 
government spent 200 million rand to place toilets in a settlement, and the residents destroyed 
half of them because they preferred to have individual toilets at the household level 
(Interview 7). From the community’s viewpoint, walking a far distance from the household to 
the toilets is very dangerous, especially for women in crime-ridden areas, whereas the CoCT 
felt the settlement was too dense to be able to service toilets at the household level (Interview 
7). A CoCT official working in water and sanitation felt that vandalism was mainly the result 
of gang activity and crime (Interview 12). He/she explained” 
“You’ll find where crime and gangsterism and drugs are happening in the areas itself, 




material and taps and things like that to try and sell the materials for drugs. (Interview 
12).  
Addressing flood risk in informal settlement generally requires some level of temporary or 
permanent displacement on behalf of the residents, whether residents receive a formal house, 
incremental upgrading, reblocking, or temporary relocation during floods. One consistent 
challenge faced by the CoCT is finding land for this. The CoCT has to negotiate with national 
and provincial government in order to make land available, and officials recognise how 
difficult this is (Interview 7). According to one official in DRM, “The only thing for us to 
address the vulnerabilities in informal settlements is to make land available, to make houses 
available” (Interview 7). One CoCT official went so far as to say, “Why is there flooding? 
It’s because of the housing shortage” (Interview 1). Land is so scarce that in some situations, 
there is nowhere to relocate people during flood events, or nowhere to even temporarily 
locate people so that in-situ upgrading or reblocking can be done in their community 
(Interview 2; Interview 7). ISN members can essentially carry out reblocking plans on their 
own, but without land to temporarily house residents, it is extremely difficult to demolish and 
rebuild homes (Interview 2). When land is not available, residents and the CoCT are forced to 
take coping measures in response to flooding. For residents, this includes creating makeshift 
walking platforms (Interview 2) and digging trenches to drain water away from houses 
(Interview 10).  For the CoCT, this means providing soft relief (Interview 1; Interview 7);  
and milling, which is a material less-porous than sand that can help raise the level of the floor 
in households (Interview 5; Interview 7). 
In the rare occasions when land does become available, residents (or prospective residents) 
are able to exploit loopholes in order to secure land, sometimes at the disadvantage of those 
on waiting lists. If word gets out that the municipality has purchased land, people will begin 
settling there in anticipation of housing opportunities nearby (Interview 8). An ISB official 
explains, “You find people running to where they see there’s a lot of developments taking 
place you know? Also hoping that they would get an opportunity quicker than the normal 
way” (Interview 5). Another official explained: 
…it’s very dangerous for the municipality to purchase land up front with the intention 
of housing people there because if you cannot guard that thing, that piece of land, 
people will flock to that and you have to move those people out, and they think that 




Sometimes the CoCT will successfully relocate people away from a flood-prone area, or will 
relocate those in an informal settlement to formal housing, only to find that the area is 
occupied again before long (Interview 5). One official described it as a “constant cycle of 
managing that space until everyone gets removed from an area” (Interview 7). This requires 
anti-land invasion, metro police, law enforcement, and a huge cost (Interview 7; Interview 8). 
Other opportunistic residents will have multiple family members putting their names on the 
housing waiting list from various locations, hoping to get a housing opportunity before others 
(Interview 8). Some residents have become paranoid and untrusting of the upgrading system. 
They do not want to be reblocked, or even relocated to a proper service site, because they feel 
like they will be forgotten by the government after their immediate needs are met (Interview 
10).  
Another interesting challenge was mentioned by only one CoCT official, but is worth 
mentioning. This official came from the Eastern Cape, where the municipal reach is limited, 
and thus some communities still do not have basic services (Interview 8). In these areas 
NGOs fill the gaps left by the municipality, which he/she appreciates (Interview 8). However, 
in this official’s opinion, NGOs in Cape Town are reactive, in that they “knock the City for 
services that have already been rendered where in other areas there is nothing being done and 
they also do nothing there” (Interview 8). In his/her opinion, the CoCT does not fail, they 
provide services; but a toilet that is working properly will never make the news (Interview 8). 
It is hard to argue with the opinion that the CoCT rarely gets credit from NGOs or 
community-based organisations on services that are functioning properly. Other officials also 
touched on the fact that the CoCT has carried out a lot of development in informal 
settlements (Interview 5; Interview 7). For the official in question, it is frustrating that the 
NGO exploits the CoCT’s weaknesses in order to gain funding, and does not acknowledge or 
appreciate the positive actions taken by the City (Interview 8). Having interviewed the NGO 
and ISN leaders, I can confirm that the majority or anecdotes are related to the failings of the 
CoCT rather than their successes.  
5.2.2 Challenges faced by ISN 
The majority of the challenges faced by ISN relate to difficulties in attempting to work with 
the CoCT. Poor communication between residents, ward councillors, and the CoCT was 




The most challenge with the City is that when we try to actually make an appointment 
with them; you agree to a date, you agree to a time, but when that specific day 
comes…They always postpone meeting to another day. ‘We are busy.’ (Interview 2). 
Another ISN leader recalled a CoCT official coming to the settlement to determine if the 
stagnant floodwater near their toilets was sewer water or not (Interview 3). The official took 
samples and pictures, and then never came back (Interview 3). The water was still there at the 
time of the interview, six months later (see Figure 4). One ward councillor also 
acknowledged the problem of communication: “You see, some of the officials…when you 
trying to communicate with them, you will see sometimes…maybe he is busy or what, but 
they ignore the calls. That is the main problem…communication” (Interview 10). This ward 
councillor feels communication is vital for providing service to the people, even if it means 
communicating that the service provision “cannot happen today”, as this type communication 
is better than nothing at all (Interview 10). Researchers in the field of flooding and 
governance in Cape Town have long acknowledged this communication issue. Joubert (2014: 
16) emphasises that “for flood risk management to be effective, there needs to be better 
communication and collaboration between formal and informal leadership in the City, and in 
communities.” Desportes, Waddel and Horijk (2016) suggested that communication issues 
can also be a result of political standoffs between ward councillors and community members 





that can escalate into issues between the community and CoCT, exacerbating the already 
weak relationships that exist.  
The issue of communication relates to one of the main challenges identified, a lack of 
coordination and collaboration between CoCT departments involved in managing flood risk. 
Almost every interviewee made explicit or implicit references to the silo-based nature of 
departmental planning and implementation.  In one instance, the NGO was responsible for 
coordinating the first interaction between two CoCT officials, one of whom worked for 
Recreation and Parks and one who worked for DRM (Interview 4). In the NGO employees’ 
words, “there is no interdepartmental integration. They do not talk to each other” (Interview 
4). Another NGO employee provided the following example:  
They’ll…deliver like a block of toilets and then you know, you’ll do a reblocking 
project like 5 months later and the lack of conversation and correspondence between 
the silos in the city and us…means that things get taken down and repeated rather 
than doing something well once…” (Interview 4).  
This mirrors Ziervogel et al.’s (2016b: 13) conclusion that “flood risk management is 
constrained because of overlapping yet disconnected activities of departments with the CoCT 
and those in provincial and National Government.” In a CoCT official’s opinion, the issue 
stems from officials performing their specific department’s mandate and no more (Interview 
7). In his/her opinion, when trying to influence another department, someone might say: “I’m 
performing my mandate so who are you to come and tell me this type of thing?’” (Interview 
7). A Water and Sanitation official said, “We are not actually involved with reblocking…It’s 
a different level of service and a different funding source and things like that...We purely go 
in to provide the toilets and the taps if and when the space is available” (Interview 12). The 
fact that the Water and Sanitation department is “purely” focused on its own mandate 
supports Desportes, Waddell and Hordijk’s (2016: 73) observation that “Silo-based reporting 
structures and operating and funding mechanisms also hamper collaboration between 
departments.”  
In parallel to this lack of collaboration, the silo-based nature of the different CoCT 
department also allows responsibilities to be skirted and blame to be placed somewhere else. 
According to NGO employees, they often hear that their requests will be handled by a 
different department, even in meetings where the CoCT was supposed to ensure the right 




NGO and the CoCT to build a park in an informal settlement, it took the NGO over a year to 
find the right people to talk to (Interview 4). According to an employee of the NGO: “It’s a 
long time for communities who you kind of shared the idea and they are saying ‘When are 
you going to implement?” (Interview 4). When the different departments are in a room 
together, such as when the Flood Task Team meets, a lack of accountability can prevent 
actions from taking place. The CoCT Flood Response Task Team evaluates their flood 
response based on level of effort, not action (Interview 1). They ask themselves, “So if we 
responded to something, how good was our effort at the end of the day?...What could we do 
better?” (Interview 1). One CoCT official was even kicked out of a task team meeting for 
trying to hold another official accountable for not following through on building a platform in 
a settlement to raise the services off the ground (Interview 7). According to an NGO 
employee: 
It is that thing of like, no-one’s responsible. Then the higher you go, there’s always 
someone else who’s responsible so you never get to the cause of the problem because 
it’s always the contractor who doesn’t do his job or an official who doesn’t have the 
power to make decisions. So as a community… people get disabled because there’s 
actually…no structure to hold anyone to account (Interview 4).  
One thing that exacerbates the lack of collaboration, both between departments and between 
actors at all levels, is the amount of bureaucracy and red tape required to get things done. 
Within the CoCT, it is not particularly easy to work with another department. Special forms 
and approvals are required, and in the case of a DRM official, comprehensive motivations are 
necessary for one department’s recommendations to be considered by another, and when the 
motivation is complete, sometimes it is “dumped in the rubbish bin because I don’t have any 
bylaw that brings some kind of enforcement” (Interview 7). From the community and NGO 
side, outside of registering complaints online or by phone, trying to actually work with the 
CoCT requires reinventing the wheel every time. One NGO employee talked about what 
happens during successful engagesments with the CoCT as follows: 
…it’s not really a process. You get the right officials, you connect, they buy into what 
you’re saying. You have a good working relationship, good communication, they are 
very responsive to your queries and so on and it happens… But it’s not something that 




When a process finally gets rolling, one ISN member feels like there are constant delays, 
which is why he/she prefers to work with NGOs, who tend to act more quickly (Interview 9). 
When delays occur, whether it’s the CoCT’s delay or an NGO’s delay, it leads to cascading 
negative consequences such as weakened leadership, weakened organisation, distrust, and a 
lack of will to restart the process over again (Interview 4).  
Even when formal processes exist, such as the housing waiting list or UISP, the lack of 
procedural transparency frustrates community members and the NGO. When questioned 
about how the CoCT decides which informal settlements to upgrade, officials gave mixed 
responses. One official said “we try to find a solution as close as possible to where people is 
current residing” (Interview 8), while another official said that the age of the settlement and 
the particular conditions in the settlements are considered (Interview 5). However, despite the 
fact that “the City tries to be fair”, Interviewee 5 also stated that “you’ll find that settlements 
that were not that old have been developed simply because…they actually demanded 
something to be done you know, in terms of flood relief…” (Interview 5). While it is 
reassuring to know that community pressure works, it is also unclear how “fair” this decision-
making process is. One thing that is clear from the community’s side, is that any process 
dealing with housing opportunities or service provision is a long-term process. Some people 
who received a plot through UISP in the early 2000’s are still waiting for their houses to be 
built (Interview 5).  
This disconnect between the short-term mindset behind the CoCT’s interventions, and the 
long-term, on-the-ground reality in informal settlements, is a major challenge for community 
members. From the CoCT’s perspective, if a settlement is slated to be moved or upgraded in 
the next couple of years, then it is considered a waste of resources to reblock or upgrade 
infrastructure in that area (Interview 7; Interview 11). However, even CoCT officials 
acknowledge the long wait that residents face when they put their names on the housing 
waiting list. One official said, “The list is so long and the delivery is so slow that people will 
remain on that list for another 20-30 years before they get helped” (Interview 8). The 
community understands how long these processes will take, which is why they want longer-
term solutions to the flooding problem, such as reblocking, which eliminates flooding and 
allows for services intended for long-term use to be established (Interview 3). One ISN leader 
used the example of chemical toilets, which the CoCT says they will change within six 




If we have the flood, maybe they come with blankets, saline and food. But these things, 
they don’t help us….the city they say ‘no, this thing is temporal [temporary]’, but you 
remind that this is not temporary, it’s a long-term process…we need a permanent 
solution- you must reblock the people (Interview 3). 
There is a major disconnect between the length of time spent on the housing waiting list, and 
the short-term nature of flooding interventions. One CoCT official explains, “Long-term 
planning is our housing roll-out plan…when the housing program is rolled out, it will 
eradicate the conditions under which people are currently living.” However, the contradiction 
of strategies based on “long-term planning” to eliminate how people are “currently living” is 
not lost on communities, who are fed up with soft-relief and coping mechanisms.  
5.3 Barriers to Multi-Scalar Flood Governance  
The challenges faced by the CoCT and ISN shape the nature of multi-scalar flood governance 
in informal settlements. Understanding these challenges helps to understand the practices of 
multi-scalar governance, and the barriers to improving collaboration. The sections that follow 
describe the main barriers to improved multi-scalar flood governance in Cape Town: 
inconsistency, a lack of genuine participation in decision-making by residents of informal 
settlements, and the suppression of community-based movements. Reblocking is used as an 
example of multi-scalar flood governance in practice.  
5.3.1 Inconsistency 
As explained above, there are numerous people and mandates involved across the flood 
management landscape. On paper, the CoCT encourages harmonisation across policies and 
departments. In reality, the approaches taken and advocated for by the various actors 
involved are extremely varied, and policies do not always align with practice. This had led to 
a cascading dissolution of trust between the CoCT and communities, the NGO and ISN, and 
even ISN and the communities they work in, which undermines the potential for CBA.    
Numerous challenges result from the varied approaches of actors involved in the flood 
management landscape that ultimately limit the opportunities for empowering CBA in 
informal settlements. While these approaches tend to range between the extremes on a 
spectrum (for example, bottom-up approaches as one extreme versus top-down approaches as 
the alternative extreme), the data reveals a surprising number of divided approaches, which 




An example between “old school” and “new school” approaches helps to demonstrate this 
inconsistency. “Old school”, defined by Interviewee 7, are approaches that have typically 
been used in the past, which are normally top-down, low technology, and performed in a 
“tick-the-box” mentality (Interview 7). “New school” approaches are, as the name suggests, 
new ideas that address underlying vulnerabilities through sustainability and bottom-up 
initiatives (Interview 7). One CoCT official embodied the “old school” mentality in his 
reaction to the “fancy” technological and environmentally-friendly approaches that NGOs 
were advocating. He/she said: 
I think it’s maybe too sophisticated for the end-user. If you take a guy from, an 
absolute poor guy, who has never had a formal house and they give him a formal 
house with a solar geyser and a photovoltaic and an electricity meter, I mean it’s just, 
I think it’s too overwhelming (Interview 8). 
On the other end of the spectrum, one official advocated for Jo Jo tanks and community-run 
gardens to improve flood management, beautify neighborhoods, and empower communities 
(Interview 7). However, decision-makers, who are more likely than not to have an “old 
school” outlook, must approve “new school” approaches.  The “new school” official 
acknowledged that “my approach is not necessarily accepted, so you have to really motivate 
to bring these type of things…to address these risks of vulnerabilities within the 
communities” (Interview 7).   
Even more confusing than the lack of a harmonised approach to flood risk reduction, is the 
inconsistency in which the CoCT follows its own policies and procedures. The most glaring 
example of this is the CoCT’s policy towards building in detention ponds, depressions in the 
land used to capture stormwater to minimise flooding. A water and sanitation official 
explained, “We are not allowed to provide services in detention ponds or any other such city-
owned asset” (Interview 12). The justification is as follows: 
…remember a detention pond- that is its function. And its function is not in isolation. 
It functions in line with a network of pipes that forms the reticulation or the 
attenuation network of that storm water system. So it doesn’t change it just because 
people are now living in it (Interview 1). 
Even though the CoCT uses this reasoning to reject the NGO and ISN when they want to re-
purpose detention ponds, the CoCT often decides to fill in these ponds themselves, which 




first reblocked informal settlement as part of a collaboration between ISN, the NGO, and the 
CoCT, was originally in a detention pond (Interview 2). The CoCT approved filling in this 
pond in order to reblock, but now, when ISN wants to organise the reblocking of other 
settlements that are located in detention ponds, the CoCT pushes back, citing policy 
(Interview 2). The NGO describes how this type of experience undermines their work with 
ISN: 
…we’re really active in development, in the reblocking process. And if the city is not 
ready with their funding, delays. And that undermines the process. It weakens 
leadership. It weakens organisation and it creates distrust and then it’s difficult to start 
again (Interview 4). 
An ISN leader echoed this concern, explaining how the NGO can also pull the plug on 
reblocking efforts: 
We give the community promises, when it comes to the support to implement that 
[reblocking]. Maybe with [the NGO], they say “No, we don’t have the budget to do 
this.” So the community, they don’t trust us. They say, “No you are lying, guys. 
Because you said you gonna do this, you gonna make a reblocking.”...the people, they 
contribute the money when it comes to support to implement this. The [NGO] and the 
municipality maybe, they don’t agree. So who’s gonna suffer? It’s us. It’s not [the 
NGO], it’s not the City of Cape Town. It’s us. We are going to suffer because we 
already promised these people we are gonna do this. (Interview 3).  
The inconsistency of the CoCT’s actions causes confusion, which results in the NGO and 
ISN unintentionally breaking promises with each other and with communities. This makes 
their work more challenging, and undermines their respect and authority with communities.  
5.3.2 Lack of Genuine Community Engagement in Decision-Making  
Trust is further eroded by the lack of true community engagement in decision-making around 
flooding in informal settlements. The CoCT’s slogan is “Making Progress Possible. 
Together”, but does this ideology really translate to practice? While CoCT officials certainly 
understand the value of community consultation, this understanding rarely transgresses 
beyond token inclusiveness. Rather, most decisions are taken from the top-down, and any 





There are examples where consultations with communities led to positive outcomes in terms 
of service provision. In one instance, a community complained about the lack of privacy 
surrounding public toilets in their neighbourhood. The CoCT consulted with the community, 
and requested a screen to be placed in front of their toilets to improve privacy (Interview 1). 
According to the CoCT official involved, “the community was enrolled, and they were on par 
as to what needs to happen and so when infrastructure was implemented, there was no 
vandalism on it” (Interview 1). However, there are more examples of top-down decision 
making that results in negative implications for communities, particularly in regard to 
flooding. In one example, a community was not consulted before a new standpipe was built at 
the edge of a women’s yard (Interview 8). The official involved explained, “The result of that 
is, this all of a sudden became a meeting place in this lady’s yard. Her safety is compromised. 
Her yard is compromised. Her fence is compromised” (Interview 8). Further, due to the slope 
of the land, if the tap is left running, the water “is just running straight through her house” 
(Interview 8). Thus, “just by placing this [tap] one meter this way…literally one meter, then it 
will flow around her house. We in actual fact, jeopardized somebody else to an extent that 
they cannot live with that service” (Interview 8). While it is reassuring that the CoCT admits 
fault in this situation, the official described this example as “typical things…that is causing 
problems in communities” because “engineers has got maybe a harder approach, quick solve, 
less pipe, less to maintain…And we’ve got a tick in the box…Meanwhile, it’s rendering a 
huge frustration to a lot of people” (Interview 8).   
Further, consultations alone do not go far enough. This type of engagement is primarily a 
one-way street where a decision has already been made, and communities are called upon to 
provide comments or concerns. However, because of the challenges mentioned above, if ISN 
has an idea or issue they want to broach with the CoCT, it is not easy for them to get an 
audience. Even when the NGO had regular meetings with the CoCT, it was difficult to make 
progress (Interview 4). One ISN leader explained: 
…they are supposed to deliver what is needed on the ground but now the approach 
from the city now is a service approach. It’s supposed to be a bottom-up approach but 
what they do, they take decisions and throw them down. Because they don’t engage 
with the communities on what the communities want. They only come with decisions 




Outside of reblocking (explained in detail below), there is one example from the interview 
data of a project conceptualised and spearheaded from the bottom-up, that eventually 
received support from the CoCT. Communities identified an area between four settlements 
that was unsuitable for households (because it was a detention pond that flooded) that they 
wanted to develop into a public space (Interview 4). This required the intermediary support 
and coordinating skills of the NGO, and from inception to completion, took over 3 years to 
materialise (Interview 4). Because the NGO kick-started the process and was committed and 
willing to pay for the park, the CoCT then engaged with the needs of the community, and 
decided to collaborate and invest in a formal drainage system (Interview 4).  However, the 
collaboration was far from ideal, as CoCT officials were reluctant to meet with the 
community’s steering committee, preferring to speak to the NGO (Interview 4). Further, now 
that the park is completed, the CoCT departments responsible for management and 
maintenance do not share their plans with the community, who have ideas of how the park 
can be maintained in a collaborative way (Interview 4).  
Examples like this, that can actually be considered as a narrow definition of a success, show 
why the community and NGO are frustrated with the CoCT, and how the CoCT actually 
undermines the efforts of the community. However, trust goes both ways. Often community 
based initiatives can be idealized, but it is important to remember that on a situation-by-
situation basis, communities have also given the CoCT reasons to be cautious in engagement. 
Some of these reasons are mentioned above, such as vandalism and the exploitation of 
loopholes, but exploitation also exists within communities themselves. Informal settlement 
landlords monopolise large structures and rent them to multiple families to make a profit 
(Interview 7), while others will purposefully sell10 land that floods seasonally to newcomers 
(Interview 5). Further, one official recounts an incident where community members stored, 
rather than distributed, relief provided by the city, and then sold the goods or used them for 
themselves (Interview 7). While neither side is perfect, increasing the amount of true 
collaboration between the CoCT, NGOs and community-based organisations will increase 
trust and minimise exploitation and corruption within communities.  
Despite the general lack of “togetherness” that exists currently, one CoCT official has a 
vision for community upgrading that serves as a beacon of hope for the potential of future 
collaboration. He/she wants to use aerial photography to develop large maps of settlements, 
                                                 




and then work with communities to determine the best places to place toilets and taps, given 
the topography of the land and the relevant community dynamics involved (Interview 8). In 
his/her words: 
…now I realize that consultation is not enough. People still vandalise it because it’s 
provided by the city. But if you now provide this base plan, and this base plan was 
developed by the community then they can say, ‘Hey, if you’re angry at this toilet, 
don’t break it off. Let’s just move it this way or that way.’ (Interview 8). 
While this initiative would come from the top, it still allows communities to make their own 
development plans, similar to reblocking (discussed below). Unfortunately, because this idea 
is very labour intensive, it is not currently being considered in the CoCT’s pipeline (Interview 
8).  
5.3.3 Supression of Community Movements  
The NGO’s main goal is to “build strong, independent social movements” (Interview 4). 
While ISN and the NGO both strive to mobilise communities towards self-development, ISN 
leaders are increasingly frustrated with their limited independence and lack of resources 
(Interview 2; Interview 3; Interview 9). As explained above, the one good example of a truly 
collaborative experience between the CoCT and ISN that emerged from the interview data 
was negotiated and coordinated by the NGO, and further, it was far from an ideal process. 
Because of the trust issues between the CoCT and ISN, the CoCT prefers to use NGOs as 
intermediaries between themselves and communities. For example, when the CoCT assesses 
flood risk, they elicit community perspectives and compare this information with their own 
data. However, they prefer NGOs or universities to engage with the communities during this 
process, rather than engaging themselves (Interview 1). According to one official, “It’s all to 
do with expectations…my experience is that many times when the City does it [an evaluation 
with the community], it’s not a fair reflection of what really happens” (Interview 1). From the 
community side, they would prefer to meet with CoCT officials directly, but arranging these 
meetings is difficult, and they do not feel as if they are taken seriously (Interview 3). The 
NGO is trying to help set up processes that social movements can plug into, but they admit 
that it is difficult (Interview 4). While it is useful for the NGO to facilitate engagements with 
the CoCT on behalf of ISN, the parties involved also become accustomed to this 
arrangement, which is not necessarily productive for ISN’s independence. For example, one 




community issues there is”, suggesting that there is not really a role to play for the CoCT to 
engage with communities directly.  
In general, the NGO and ISN have a strong working relationship. However, two of the ISN 
leaders interviewed indicated growing resentment over their lack of compensation. Being an 
ISN leader is essentially a full-time job (which I can confirm, having personally witnessed 
their busy schedules when trying to set up interviews) but they only receive a small stipend 
for travel and per-diem. Profiling and enumeration of informal settlements is one of the main 
tasks of ISN members, which the NGO facilitates (Interview 9). This information feeds 
through the NGO to the City, and helps the city plan for service delivery in informal 
settlements. Because the NGO considers profiling and enumeration as “community work” 
they justify the non-payment of ISN (even for provisions) because the information is for the 
community’s own benefit (Interview 9). However, the NGO also benefits from this data, as 
the CoCT relies on them for this information, fortifying their role and purpose as an NGO 
(Interview 7). This issue is exacerbated by the fact that other NGOs, as well as the EPWP 
program, are paying community members for the same data collection work that ISN 
members are doing for the NGO (Interview 9). Further, one ISN leader accused the NGO of 
taking credit for ISN’s work in order to receive funding from donors (Interview 3) and one 
CoCT official criticised the NGO for charging a surplus fee for reblocking when residents 
want to have the same size house that they previously had  (since normally, reblocking 
requires minimising house size) (Interview 7).  
Working with the NGO is a double-edged sword for ISN. On one hand, they are empowered 
by having access to urban planning professionals who support them and help them liaise with 
the CoCT.  On the other hand, they feel as if their power is stifled by their lack of 
independence. While some of the NGO’s funding is used to support ISN, as a non-profit, the 
NGO only exists because there is a need for their services in the community. Complete 
independence of ISN would mean the community no longer needs the support of the NGO. 
The NGO’s mentality and strategy speaks to an independent ISN; one NGO employee 
explained, “…the idea is to coordinate but you do the work. We will create the space and give 
other support but you do the work, you do the thinking. We will bring our knowledge to that 
and ultimately, it’s your project” (Interview 4). However, one ISN leader described the 




There’s a lot of things we cannot do, we want to do but we cannot do because we 
don’t have the funds to do that…So we can’t get anything. So now we have the 
power, how to use it?...Because [the NGO] do whatever they want to do. If they say 
‘no we don’t have a budget for this’. We can’t do nothing…It’s our power, they use it. 
You understand? (Interview 3). 
ISN would not be where they are today without the help of the NGO, but at the same time, 
reliance on the NGO is keeping ISN from growing independently. Further, the NGO has 
positioned themselves between ISN and the CoCT when it comes to reblocking, cementing 
their role in this process for the indefinite future.  
5.4 Multi-Scalar Flood Governance in Practice: Reblocking  
Reblocking is a strategy created by informal settlement residents to improve living standards 
in their communities. It involves “the reconfiguration and repositioning of shacks in very 
dense informal settlements in accordance to a community-drafted spatial framework” (SDI 
Alliance, 2013). De-densifying settlements allows access for emergency vehicles and allows 
space for municipal services provision (Interview 4; Interview 7). Reconfiguring settlements 
also allows for proper drainage to be established to prevent flooding, and reduces the risk of 
fires spreading (Interview 4). According to an ISN leader, ISN was able to sell this idea to the 
CoCT, who “didn’t actually believe that there is capability that we will be able to make 
access within the dense informal settlement” (Interview 2). This is confirmed by a CoCT 
official, who said, “In fact, when I looked at that place, how it looked, I never thought that we 
would be able to organise it in such an orderly manner and they have been making it looks so 
beautiful as it is now” (Interview 5). Most actors interviewed consider reblocking to be an 
excellent intervention, particularly as it relates to flood risk reduction (Interview 2; Interview 
3; Interview 5; Interview 7; Interview 11). One ISN leader even considers reblocking a 
“permanent solution” because people are satisfied with the outcome for the indefinite future. 
He/she said, “Because if you reblock people…even they don’t need the houses, because they 
say ‘I have my water. I have my toilet. I don’t have flood. If there is a raining…I am still 
safe.’ You understand? That is the permanent.” (Interview 3).  The challenges are the need to 
downsize structures in order to make space and the need to negotiate complicated community 
dynamics (Interview 7). For instance, some of the more powerful landlords in settlements 
prefer the current arrangement (Interview 7), and others worry that the government will 




In 2012, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between ISN, the NGO and the 
CoCT to formalise a partnership in upgrading informal settlements (Interview 4). After that, 
the Mshini Wam informal settlement was used as the first pilot collaborative reblocking 
project (Interview 2). This settlement has now become a learning centre both nationally and 
internationally to share experiences and lessons around engaging governments in inclusive 
development (SDI Alliance, 2013). In 2013, the CoCT adopted reblocking as an official city 
policy, and identified 22 new prospective collaborative projects, many of which included 
reblocking (SDI Alliance, 2013). However, the NGO explained, “but ever since then, you 
know it’s been a challenge for us to actually get cooperation from the city. So you have this 
policy that show some intent, but resource-wise, you have one person that’s assigned to this 
thing” (Interview 4). The NGO explained that out of the 22 prospective projects, four ended 
up on the CoCT’s budget, and only one was implemented (Interview 4). One of the ISN 
leaders explained his/her frustration: 
We have a partnership with the CoCT.  We say so. But the partnership we don’t see 
the partnership because most of the time when it comes we need something, the 
CoCT, they say “No. We can’t do this because this land is belong to this and this and 
this… (Interview 3).  





This further highlights the CoCT’s inconsistency between their policies and practices, as they 







As can be seen from the above findings, top-down flood response planning processes with 
token inclusiveness reinforce the hegemonic relationships that exist between the CoCT and 
communities. The lack of true inclusive decision-making, coupled with inconsistent actions 
and internal bureaucratic challenges, guarantees that flood response interventions will only 
maintain the status quo, and will not lift communities beyond the levels of vulnerabilities that 
make them susceptible to flood risk in the first place. Active communities recognise that their 
voices are missing in decision-making. ISN pushes back against this hegemonic governance 
relationship by coordinating planning processes from the ground-up that take community 
opinions seriously. ISN’s design and implementation of the reblocking strategy highlights the 
ability of communities to make transitional CBA efforts when empowered by the right actors. 
The following chapter analyses the nature of the flood response approaches taken by the 
CoCT and ISN. It begins by discussing the limitations of the CoCT’s flood-response efforts 
to lead to effective adaptation, emphasising the lack of true community inclusion. A counter-
example is also provided where everyday governance practices have enabled certain CoCT 
staff to truly engage with bottom-up approaches. The next section (6.2) explains how ISN 
pushes back against hegemonic governance norms by navigating invited and invented spaces 
of citizenship. The strategy of reblocking is used as a prime example, where relationships 
with the right actors allowed the community to influence government policy from the ground-
up. The last section (6.3) describes how these top-down and bottom-up approaches relate to 
eachother, and how they can be reconciled as a step towards transformative CBA.  
6.1 Top-down: Adaptation that maintains the Status Quo 
6.1.1 “Don’t call me resilient again!”  
The CoCT’s responses to flooding help residents in informal settlements cope with flooding, 
but they do not reduce the vulnerabilities that make residents susceptible to flooding in the 
first place. Before the rainy season, the CoCT may capacitate residents, maintain trenches, 
and provide milling to raise the level of homes. These efforts help residents withstand the 
seasonal floods and return to life as usual following the winter. This aligns with Pelling’s 
(2011: 42) definition of resilience “as the degree of elasticity in a system, its ability to 
rebound or bounce back after experiencing some stress or shock.” While resilience may 




disasters. She cites Tracie Washington, the President of the Louisiana Justice Institute, who 
started a public campaign around the argument “Stop calling me resilient”, referring to how 
victims of Hurricane Katrina and the BP Oil spill were praised (Feldman, 2015; cited in 
Kaika, 2017). Kaika (2017: 95) explains, “If we took Tracie Washington’s objection 
seriously, we would stop focusing on how to make citizens more resilient…as this would 
only mean that they can take more suffering, deprivation or environmental degradation in the 
future.” This relates directly to residents of informal settlements, who, despite years of winter 
readiness plans and flooding task teams, still find themselves susceptible to flooding year 
after year.  
In fact, the CoCT’s flood interventions are really better defined as coping strategies, meaning 
they reduce sensitivity to flooding, rather than avoiding flooding or reducing the likelihood of 
it happening again (Few, Brown & Tompkins, 2007). Some efforts are purely reactive, such 
as the provision of “soft relief.” One ISN leader thought the money spent on reactive 
measures like soft relief or fire kits would be better spent on preventing the disasters in the 
first place (Interview 2).The CoCT shows resistance to actual adaptation measures, such as 
reblocking and infrastructural upgrades, which would help to reduce or eliminate flooding all 
together. As mentioned in the results section (chapter 5), the CoCT’s short-term vision of 
informal settlements makes them hesitant to upgrade sewage and stormwater drains (which 
are often sources of flooding), and means that reblocking projects have not been actualised as 
promised. Pelling (2011: 43) characterizes this type of response as “resistance to change”, 
motivated by a desire to maintain the status quo and only effect small changes that do not 
disrupt the current power system. These small changes address symptoms, but not causes of 
vulnerability (Pelling, 2011). The CoCT’s actions certainly align with Pelling’s (2011) 
explanation of resilience as “maintaining the status quo.” In the case of informal settlement 
residents, the status quo is still high levels of vulnerability, both to flooding, and to other 
everyday risks, as noted earlier. As mentioned in the literature review (chapter 2), Pelling 
(2011: 50) contrasts this definition of resilience with transformational adaptation, which is 
“indicated by reform in over-arching political-economy regimes and associated cultural 
discourses on development, security and risk.” This aligns with Kaika’s (2017) solution to the 
“don’t call me resilient” problem, which is to target the actors and processes that drive 
vulnerability in the first place. Following this line of reasoning, the CoCT is maintaining the 
status quo of vulnerability, rather than exploring the potential of adaptation as transformation 




engaging with the more social, economic and political dynamics of informal settlements, 
rather than focusing on techno-managerial solutions.  As described in the historical and 
political economic context section (chapter three), flood vulnerability in informal settlements 
is related to historical injustices, uncertain regulations, global capitalistic forces, as well as 
national political agendas. Addressing vulnerability in informal settlements requires 
acknowledging, engaging, and addressing these wider drivers that ultimately result in 
vulnerability and everyday risk for residents in informal settlements.  
6.1.2 Domination through inclusion 
As alluded to in the results section (chapter 5), the CoCT’s engagement with communities is 
mostly symbolic, and they are reluctant to engage directly with community members. There 
are numerous examples of top-down interventions where decisions are made at the City level, 
and communities are simply asked their opinions. For example, one ward councillor 
described a new formal housing project where “we [The CoCT] finish all of the professional 
services and then bring the product to the community and say, ‘this is the product. What is 
your view on it?” (Interview 11). Kaika (2017) references a growing reluctance amongst 
communities of being “included” in conversations with authorities about issues that affect 
them. For example, the Rosiene community in Romania rejected “inclusion”, acknowledging 
that “When invited to be “included”, there was already a clear role assigned to them: not that 
of the equal co-decision maker in setting development goals and allocating resources, but that 
of the subordinate subject…” (Velicu & Kaika, 2017; cited in Kaika, 2017). The CoCT’s 
inclusion of communities mirrors this hegemonic relationship, which reinforces existing 
power dynamics. Miraftab refers to this type of relationship as “domination through 
inclusion” (2009: 39), where people might gain access and participation in a governance 
system that, at the same time, avoids making any substantive redistributive actions. This 
domination is exemplified by one CoCT official who described how his department will 
“feed into” community actions plans because “if there is quick wins within those plans, we 
actually grab it because sometimes you can’t always do the one big thing people ask for” 
(Interview 1). This “legitimation” of community demands is what Miraftab (2009: 41) claims 
is “central to hegemonic relations of power.”  
The idea of domination through inclusion can also be leveraged to understand the relationship 
between ISN and the NGO. As explained above in the results section (chapter 5), ISN feels 




Western Cape, another bottom-up movement of the self-organising urban poor, reject NGOs 
entirely, declaring that, “NGOs often control social movements through the power of their 
funds and legitimation” (Miraftab, 2009: 36). This resonates with ISN’s relationship with the 
NGO, which is further convoluted by the NGO’s (and CoCT’s) use of the data that ISN 
collects. Dodman and Mitlin (2013: 25) summarise an argument made by Kothari (2001, 
cited in Dodman and Mitlin, 2013) to explain how “including local knowledge within an 
externally determined framework is simultaneously a mechanism for controlling information, 
its analysis, and its (re)presentation.” Regardless of ISN’s participation in processes of 
profiling and enumeration, and even in consultation, they are still excluded from the most 
important processes: those related to decision making. Drawing on decolonial theory, 
Miraftab (2009: 45) explains: 
Historicizing the notion of inclusion from the vantage point of the ex-colonies allows 
us to see how the participation of the oppressed in their own conditions of oppression 
functions to normalize those oppressive relations, in the post-colony as it had in the 
colony. That helps us to understand the political career of citizen participation, how 
the inferiority and superiority of oppressed and oppressor may well continue in an 
‘inclusive’ planning process. 
Thus, by participating in inclusive planning processes without having substantive input into 
decision-making, ISN is contributing to the historical power dynamics that have maintained 
an inferior/superior relationship with the CoCT, and even with the NGO.   
6.1.3 Exceptions: Defying Norms through Everyday Governance   
It is important, especially within a situated UPE approach, not to homogenise the experiences 
and efforts of the actors involved across the flood management landscape in Cape Town. 
Therefore, this study highlights the experiences and efforts of one CoCT official in particular, 
through exploring practices of everyday governance that expose the “heterogenous on-the-
ground realities of policy implementation and resource use” (Cornea, Véron & Zimmer, 
2017). However, while the literature on everyday governance tends to focus on the 
micropolitics and power that reinforce inequalities (Cornea, Véron & Zimmer, 2017; Blundo 
& Le Meur, 2009), this example focuses on the positive outcomes that can result from 
individuals leveraging their agency to fight inequality. The individual in question even uses 
loopholes to bypass bureaucratic processes when it helps the community (Interview 7). For 




than Water and Sanitation, because issues that are considered a health risk will be prioritised 
by the CoCT (Interview 7). In another instance, the official wanted to reduce the flooding risk 
of a particular river by filling in part of it to move the floodplain away from a settlement 
(Interview 7). He/she knew the process would either be delayed or denied because procedure 
requires abiding by NEMA, so he/she asked the community to fill it in themselves, so the 
CoCT could not be fined for disregarding environmental acts (Interview 7). In this way, the 
official uses everyday practices to ensure that flooding risks are reduced, even if it means 
diverging from official CoCT policies and procedures.  
While Lawhon, Ernston and Silver.’s (2014: 507) description of everyday practices is focused 
on the perspectives of the urban poor, the authors’ main ideas can be applied to this setting to 
emphasise “the ordinary practices of city-making” that highlight the limitations of the state in 
controlling and structuring city’s residents. In Cornea, Véron and Zimmer’s words, “…even 
with structures led by written rules, guidelines, regulations, and laws, there is often disparity 
between the official model and actual behaviour on the ground” (Corbridge et al., 2005, 
Bierschenk & Olivier de Sardan, 2014b, Mountz, 2010, Olivier de Sardan, 2014, Roy, 2002, 
Tarlo, 2000; cited in Cornea, Véron & Zimmer 2015: 6). Further, outside of official rules and 
regulations, this official also defies the CoCT’s norms when it comes to flood risk reduction 
by applying a “new-school” approach. He/she has been striving to change the status quo by 
cultivating meaningful relationships with community members, taking indigenous knowledge 
seriously, and vying for sustainable options to flood management that address the underlying 
vulnerabilities in communities (Interview 7).  
6.2 Bottom-up: Insurgent Citizenship  
6.2.1 ISN’s Insurgent Citizenship 
ISN understands that the CoCT’s decision making process is far from inclusive. As 
mentioned above, one ISN leader suggested that: “…they take decisions and throw them 
down” (Interview 3). In fact, ISN’s organisational objectives are seemingly designed to 
combat this hegemonic relationship. They specifically aim to “challenge the way our cities 
are planned” and ensure that “local, community-level initiatives drive any citywide or 
national agenda” (SDI South African Alliance, 2012a). These objectives speak to the 
ideology behind the theory of insurgent planning, which “seeks to achieve real, substantive 
inclusion which is either not present in the mandate of synoptic planning, or is being co-opted 




427). ISN’s version of insurgent planning involves leading by example. Even though there 
are distinct regional ISN leaders, their planning process is truly horizontal. One ISN leader 
explained, “…we are not leading the people, the people they must lead themselves…so if I 
am going to your informal settlement, it’s you who must wake up…you must go first, you 
must go in front of me” (Interview 3). ISN’s vision of a just city is represented well by 
Miraftab (2009: 44): 
Whoever the actors, what they do is identifiable as insurgent planning if it is 
purposeful actions that aim to disrupt domineering relationships of oppressors to the 
oppressed, and to destabilize such a status quo through consciousness of the past and 
imagination of an alternative future. 
While ISN is not yet disrupting or refusing the process of symbolic “inclusion” like the 
Rosiene Community in Romania, they are exploring how different practices of citizenship 
can be harnessed to achieve their goals. 
The navigation of invited and invented spaces of citizenship can be a powerful strategy for 
insurgent movements (Miraftab, 2009). ISN is inventing new ways of organising and 
developing their settlements, but presenting these ideas to the CoCT in a language and format 
the City understands. In this way, their use of invited and invented spaces aligns with Piper 
and Nadvi’s (2010: 214) definition of state-driven (invited space) versus social-movement-
driven (invented space). For example, reblocking is a strategy that ISN “invented” outside of 
formal governance channels, but in order for the CoCT to understand its merits, they have to 
collect data through enumeration and profiling, and liaise with the CoCT through the NGO 
partner in order to be taken seriously. The oscillation between inclusion and resistance is 
characteristic of insurgent citizenship practices, where spaces of invited and invented 
citizenship are flexibly traversed (Miraftab, 2009). One ISN leader explained a new strategy 
ISN plans to use that also operates in both spaces of citizenship. He/she came up with a plan 
to create a forum of all of the settlements that have drainage problems, so that they can 
approach the CoCT with numbers, and ideally get a better response than when ISN leaders 
have gone individually (Interview 3). He/she explained “…but if we are going there [the 
Civic Centre], we are a lot of people complaining one thing…MAYBE they are listening” 
(Interview 3). It is clear that the use of both invited and invented spaces of citizenship can 
influence the CoCT. As one CoCT official admitted, the CoCT prioritises action in informal 




5). Both approaches, the fluidity between the two, and the successes therein, illustrate the 
main idea of subaltern urbanism: the subaltern (in this case, residents of informal settlements) 
has political agency, and uses it strategically to meet their goals.  
6.2.2 Importance of Strong Networks 
ISN’s relationship with the NGO is complex. On one hand, it is not surprising that ISN 
worries about funding and power. However, there is no denying the importance of their 
relationship with the NGO, and the doors that this relationship has opened for them. Both 
Soltesova et al. (2014) and Drivdal (2016) discuss the importance of networks in empowering 
the actors involved in CBA. These networks include technical experts, government officials, 
and other NGOs, each of whom have their own extensions of networks that can be accessed 
(Drivdal, 2016; Soltesova et al., 2014). For example, one ISN leader explained how the NGO 
is “trying their best to bring the City within the communities and understand what is needed 
on the ground” (Interview 2). The NGO’s utility in the reblocking process is widely 
recognised (Interview 2; Interview 3). The interview data also revealed how important 
particular individuals can be within networks, and how this can be geographically limiting. 
For example, the CoCT official who defies the CoCT’s norms through everyday governance 
has a particular regional mandate (Interview 7). The ward councillor in his region described 
in admiration how he/she is active and present in communities, and how community members 
even phone him/her directly when they have issues (Interview 10). In this individual’s region, 
community members might find themselves beneficiaries of community gardens or Jo Jo 
tanks, while in other regions, community members might be faced with officials who prefer 
“old school” approaches. What is clear from the literature on urban adaptation governance, is 
that strong political champions are critical in networks to both spearhead adaptation 
initiatives and to facilitate true inclusivity (Chu, Angueloveski & Carmin, 2016; Leck & 
Roberts, 2015; Vedeld et al., 2015).For CBA actors to be empowered, and for their efforts to 
be scalable, they need strong networks that support bottom-up initiatives. This includes the 
type of political champions mentioned above, but also access to resources and inclusion in 
the political processes that shape their lives.   
6.2.3 Reblocking as transitional CBA 
Despite the challenges that ISN and the NGO face in growing the reblocking movement with 
the CoCT, reblocking is still one of ISN’s greatest successes. There is no question that 




adaptation, specifically CBA. The question is to what extent this method can lead to 
transformation. In terms of Pelling’s (2011: 68) characterisations of responses to climate 
change, reblocking coincides with transitional adaptation, defined as “incremental change to 
social (including economic, political and cultural) relations”. ISN took a community-designed 
idea, executed it successfully, and influenced the CoCT to the degree that they adopted 
reblocking as an official policy. Reblocking meets the criteria for economic, political and 
cultural change that characterises transitional adaptation. Politically, reblocking was adopted 
as a CoCT policy, which can be considered a “reform in the application of governance” 
(Pelling, 2011: 69); economically, short-term jobs are created through the EPWP during the 
reblocking process (SDI Alliance, 2012b); and culturally, the reblocking process leads to 
improved collective action and self-reliance in communities (Lande & Zimmermann, 2018). 
Reblocking has no intention of regime change, and thus falls short of full transformational 
adaptation, but it is an assertion and pathway towards citizen’s rights, which Pelling 
considers “an intermediary level of engagement” with the governance regime (2011: 50). In 
addition to the successful expression of citizens’ rights and resulting reform in governance, 
reblocking also allows informal settlement resident’s to take advantage of their 
constitutionally-guaranteed rights to free basic services. By opening up spaces in informal 
settlements, the CoCT can then install municipal services, a win-win situation for both 
residents and government.  However, reblocking is limited in its ability to enact 
transformation by several factors. ISN’s objectives speak to a concern with the broader 
processes shaping flood risks, but their framing of the flooding issue is still mainly local, i.e., 
concerned with infrastructure upgrades, formal drainage channels, and land-use. Pelling 
(2011) emphasises the importance of framing, which has implications for determining who is 
to blame, and who will bear the costs of adaptation.  Further, ISN and the NGO’s actions are 
not motivated by a responsibility towards sustainable development or environmental 
protection (Interview 3; Interview 4), although the NGO acknowledged this as a weak point 
in their projects (Interview 4). Pelling (2011) cites the importance of a relationship with the 
environment towards transformation.With impending (and current) climate change impacts, 
an understanding of environmental risks and environmental balance would be useful for ISN 
and the NGO to plan for the future. While ISN and the NGO’s actions, reblocking in 
particular, are great examples of adaptation as development, they would not describe their 
own work in those terms, for better or worse. Finally, while reblocking does address the 




vulnerabilities. Pelling (2011: 97) equates this to the “distinction between treating the 
symptoms and causes of illness.”  
6.3 Towards Transformative CBA Enabled by Multi-Scalar Governance  
6.3.1 Negotiating Tension through Relational Power  
The competing modes of practice initiated by the CoCT (top-down) and ISN (bottom-up) to 
eliminate flood risk have created an “in between” filled with tension, confusion and 
frustration for the actors involved. This disorder is fuelled on one hand by opposing 
approaches to flood management driven by different ways of seeing the issue of flooding. For 
example, even with an understanding of the long-term nature of housing delivery, informal 
settlements are often still treated as temporary occurrences. In describing an upcoming 
housing project in his/her ward, one councillor explained, “…there won’t be a reblocking 
process because of the current [housing] project we have planned…otherwise we waste 
resources” (Interview 11). This conflict in notions of permanence versus temporariness is a 
fundamental tension between the CoCT and ISN, as the CoCT cannot adequately address the 
vulnerabilities that exacerbate flood risk in informal settlements without understanding the 
on-the-ground, long-term realities of the residents who live there. ISN designed reblocking as 
an attempt to resolve this disjuncture and come up with a long-term solution, but, as 
mentioned, these efforts have stalled. This disjuncture is most easily witnessed in the 
continued flooding of the same informal settlements year after year, where residents are 
forced to once again prove their “resilience”.  
On the other hand, tension is also created by the CoCT’s lack of authentic commitment to 
community engagement, which, as mentioned above, reinforces a hegemonic power 
imbalance between government and communities. The lack of true engagement with 
communities stems from an incapacity and unwillingness to address the social dimensions of 
multiscalar governance, such as inequality and informality (Vedeld et al., 2015). In response 
to this imbalance of power, ISN makes inequality and informality central to their vision of a 
just city. This vision involves the inclusion of residents of informal settlements in decision-
making that impacts their lives, an assertion that represents the will of the people to 
appropriate some of the power that the CoCT exerts over them. Miraftab (2009: 34) explains 
that while neoliberal governments practice dominance by inclusion, “...the process also 
creates a disjunction that insurgent movements are able to take advantage of”. ISN recognises 




Their response to this recognition is well characterised by Miraftab (2009: 34), who explains 
how “Counter-hegemonic movements may use such contradictory conditions to destabilize 
the neoliberal hegemonic order”.  ISN’s insurgent planning practices and navigation of 
invited and invented spaces are an attempt at this destabilisation.   
This relational power struggle is not only expressed at the organisational level, but also at the 
network and individual level. Rocheleau and Roth (2007, cited in Lawhon, 2012: 957) 
explain, “A relational view of power is a reminder that power is always being reshaped 
dynamically with respect to the type, terms, and strength of a relationship, and the structure 
of and position of an actor within a network.” For example, changes in the nature of the 
relationship between the NGO and the CoCT have impacted the prospects for reblocking 
projects, despite the fact the the CoCT adopted this as an official policy. When the MoU 
between the CoCT and the NGO was originally signed, regular meetings were held and 22 
future reblocking projects were identified (Interview 4). This momentum faded as elections 
were held and the CoCT went through an organisational transformation process (Interview 4), 
effectively altering the network that the NGO used to initiate reblocking projects. Now, as the 
NGO tries to rebuild their partnership with the CoCT, reblocking projects have been side-
lined because the CoCT claims not to have the funding, the funding is reassigned (Interview 
4), or, as mentioned above, a community might be expected to receive housing, and 
reblocking would be considered a waste of resources in the “short-term”. Because the 
relationship between the CoCT and the NGO is currently weak, it is easier for the CoCT to 
exert power by “selectively responding” (Lawhon, Ernston & Silver., 2014: 510) to the 
NGO’s requests. 
At the individual level, everyday practices present an entry point to exercise relational power 
in contrast to institutional norms. As mentioned above, one CoCT official created positive 
change within the network of his/her influence by exploiting loopholes (or even disregarding 
protocols) to ensure community members received as much support as possible. Pelling 
(2011) explains how governments are made up of actors (i.e., “individual policy 
entrepreneurs”) who “negotiate” their varying degrees of power in the design and 
implementation of rules. These actors have the ability to change a governance system, not 
through norms or principles, but through rules and decision-making (Krasner, 1932:5, cited in 
Pelling, 2011). Pelling (2011: 71) explains,  “Over time…discontinuities between norms and 
principles on one hand and governance mechanisms and practices on the other can potentially 




the governance system.” In this way, and in lieu of an overarching regime change, political 
actors can begin exerting internal pressure on governance systems to slowly transition 
towards norms and principles that support true community engagement in decision-making.  
6.3.2 Shifting Epistemological Framing  
Given both the potential and limits of CBA in urban, informal areas, how can transformative 
adaptation in Cape Town be achieved in the future? As mentioned, reblocking does address 
underlying vulnerabilities in informal settlements, but not the drivers of these vulnerabilities, 
which limits its ability to enact transformation. Behind policies and approaches is 
epistemology, “the ways people and organisations behave and organise values and perceive 
their place in the world”, which also must be targeted when aiming to achieve transformation 
(Pelling, 2011: 86).  This study has shown that the CoCT’s role in multi-scalar governance, 
while occasionally enabling of CBA, is primarily an undermining factor. This is mainly 
because their approaches to flood risk management are driven by a development paradigm 
inherent in most governments that have been touched by coloniality that prioritises economic 
growth and undervalues true community engagement (Miraftab, 2009). Miraftab (2009: 44) 
explains, “…the ideal of the Western city has been deployed historically in the colonial era, 
and is now deployed in the neoliberal era to advance a certain paradigm of development and 
capital accumulation.” However, given the importance of strong networks for CBA (Drivdal, 
2016, Soltesova et al., 2014), as well as the importance of cohesive multi-scalar governance 
for managing climate change (Leck & Simon, 2013), it is crucial that the CoCT take 
community initiatives seriously, like they did with reblocking, in order for communities to be 
truly engaged in decision-making processes that affect their lives.  
In South Africa, where the colonial wound (see Mignolo, 2009) is far from healed, decolonial 
theory can play a central role in disrupting epistemological paradigms. Mignolo (2009: 161) 
explains how the “former anthropos” [i.e., those who have been “invented” by the Europeans] 
which draws parallels to the subaltern, “are no longer claiming recognition by or inclusion in 
the humanitas [i.e., locales defined by Europeans). Instead, they are “engaging in epistemic 
disobedience and de-linking from the magic of the Western ideas of modernity, ideals of 
humanity and promises of economic growth and financial prosperity” (Mignolo, 2009: 161). 
Capitalism is one of these “Western ideas of modernity” that promises “economic growth and 
financial prosperity” and ISN’s insurgent planning is an effort to delink from these ideals.  




Fostering inclusive, pro-poor and sustainable urban development can only occur when 
the resource base is shared and a vision of long term upgrading is adopted. This 
requires the fundamental inputs of community members into the allocation of state 
resources, opening spaces to influence policy deliberations and decision-making. 
This vision mirror’s Harvey’s (2008) hypothesis that democratic control over capitalism’s 
surplus value could help drive people-centric development in cities. Building on this, ISN 
organises international exchanges that contribute to a global consolidation of the urban poor, 
a practice that addresses Harvey’s (2008) concern that the global financial system is highly 
interconnected, while social movements are not. To quote Miraftab (2009: 40): 
In this neoliberal moment tangible citizenship does not arrive through the state’s 
legislative institutions. It rather grows under the skin of the city, that is as an invisible 
city, through the insurgent practices of marginalised communities – be it 
disenfranchised immigrants; ethnicized, racialized and gendered minorities of the 
industrialized world; or the squatter citizens of the global South. 
Thus, ISN’s movement towards this vision through insurgent planning and global 
consolidation of “the squatter citizens of the global South” is an indication that the prospect 
for transformation is there, growing under the surface. This prospect needs to be taken 
seriously and given space to grow if future CBA efforts in informal settlements are to have 





The aim of this research was to understand CBA to flood risk in informal settlements in Cape 
Town through the lens of UPE. With a focus on a single case study of a community-based 
organisation and the network of actors they interact with (CoCT officials, NGO staff 
members, and ward councillors), this study used interviews to understand the relationships 
and dynamics between actors, the challenges and opportunities they face when responding to 
flood risk, how the practice of multi-scalar governance between these actors either enables or 
undermines CBA in informal areas, and finally, the potential for CBA to lead to wider 
transformation. 
While previous researchers have engaged with themes relevant to this study including CBA, 
multi-scalar governance, and adaptation as transformation, few studies have engaged these 
themes in the context of urban informality, particularly through the lens of UPE, which 
explores notions of power, justice, decoloniality and alternative theories of urbanism. 
Through this lens, flood risk management in informal areas can be understood as a complex 
and evolving web of actors who use their particular perspectives and relationships to enact 
change within the limits of the power they possess. Depending on the way an actor or an 
organisation (through institutional norms and epistemological framing) “sees” the issue of 
flooding, and based on how much power they stand to win or lose from a particular response, 
CBA in informal areas can either be enabled or undermined.    
The CoCT wants to eliminate flooding in informal settlements. However, because the issue of 
flooding is seen as a problem that can be fixed with technical or physical solutions, the City’s 
incremental flood responses are not addressing the underlying causes of vulnerability in the 
first place, and are therefore limited. In general, the results of this study found that the 
CoCT’s flood management actions are largely superficial, and undermining of ISN’s efforts 
for CBA. By targeting surface-level vulnerabilities rather than the drivers of vulnerabilities in 
informal settlements, residents are meant to cope with flooding year after year, rather than 
truly adapt. Further, the practice of symbolic inclusion in adaptation planning reinforces the 
hegemonic power dynamic between the CoCT and communities, which stifles efforts at 
bottom-up adaptation. Importantly, there are exceptions to this generalisation, as certain 
CoCT officials use their relative power to encourage community-based solutions through 




Holston (2009: 252) defines empowerment as what happens “…when a citizen’s sense of an 
objective source of right in citizenship entails a corresponding sense of subjective power – 
power to change existing arrangements (legal and other), exact compliance, compel 
behaviour.”  ISN’s response to the CoCT’s lack of empowering actions is to push for this 
“right in citizenship” and “subjective power” through insurgent planning and by seeking a 
source of empowerment elsewhere- through the NGO. While ISN’s relationship with the 
NGO is complicated through their own struggles with relational power, the NGO has also 
been able to use their relationship with the CoCT to promote community initiatives, such as 
reblocking. Reblocking is an example of CBA with the potential to lead to transformation. As 
a community designed initiative that was adopted by the CoCT as an official policy, 
reblocking has led to both political and socio-economic benefits for community members. 
However, due to changes in networks and relationships between the CoCT and the NGO, 
reblocking has been stalled in recent years.  
This research has suggested how important it is to understand the networks and 
characteristics of actors involved in CBA. However due to time and resources, this was not 
explored in a comprehensive manner. Further studies in this area could undertake in-depth 
actor-network analysis (in the discipline of political ecology) to better understand the 
roadblocks to the implementation of reblocking projects and the potential for up-scaling 
reblocking efforts. Additional research could also use insights from this study, and its use of 
UPE, to determine how CoCT policy could incorporate and support urban, informal CBA. 
Informal settlements would also benefit from site-specific climate vulnerability assessments 
that take the differentiated context of each settlement into account, allowing residents to be 
better informed about the future challenges they will face. 
Understanding CBA through an UPE lens has led to important insights about the potential for 
transformative action in urban, informal areas. Many of the challenges faced by the urban 
poor in South Africa today, whether it be everyday vulnerabilities or exposure to 
environmental risk, can be traced back to historical events, political decisions, and economic 
systems with wide-reaching, even global, implications. While it may be difficult for 
community-based movements to influence political ecological factors at the national or 
global level, there are entry-points for transformative action within the network of actors 
involved in flood risk management in Cape Town. This case has shown how this is possible 




the eyes of the community and use everyday practices of rule-making and implementation to 
slowly shift institutional norms towards a community-centred epistemological approach.  
ISN’s vision of a just city offers a contrasting approach to the CoCT, one that emphasises 
bottom-up solutions and inclusivity. However, the barriers to supporting this approach are 
entrenched in a history of oppression and neoliberalism that makes the potential for 
transformative CBA difficult to achieve. While community-based approaches can chip away 
at structural injustices from the bottom, a wider movement is needed to turn the tide of the 
global neoliberal economy that impacts all levels, including residents of informal settlements. 
To this extent, ISN’s insurgent planning could be more revolutionary if framed through a 
vision of wider decoloniality that rightfully places blame with the state and trusts in the 
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9 Appendices   
9.1 Redacted Interview List  
Interview no. Interviewee Affiliation Data and Time of Interview 
1 CoCT 16 January 2018 – 12:00 
2 ISN 17 January 2018 – 11:00 
3 ISN 18 January 2018 – 10:00 
4 NGO (5 interviewees present) 18 January 2018 – 14:30 
5 CoCT 26 January 2018 – 11:30 
6 Ward Councillor 30 January 2018 – 09:00 
7 CoCT 31 January 2018 – 08:00 
8 CoCT 05 February 2018 – 08:30 
9 ISN 06 February 2018 – 12:00 
10 Ward Councilor 07 February 2018 – 11:00 
11 Ward Councillor 13 February 2018 – 10:00 







ISN Leaders (3) 
Prompts: 
1. Can you tell me about how you became involved with ISN, your responsibilities, and 
how ISN operates within informal settlements? 
2. Why is flooding a challenge?  
3. Can you explain how ISN works with government, ward councillors and NGOs to 
reduce and respond to flood risk in settlements? 
4. How has flood management changed over time, and how could it better in the future? 
5. How does the community view environmental hazards and climate change? 
 
Specific Questions: 
General ISN Information 
1.  What settlement do you live in? 
2. How did you get involved with ISN? 
3. How long have you been involved with ISN? 
4. What are your roles/ responsibilities with ISN? 
5. Which settlements do you have experience working in?     
a. Can you describe these settlements? (who owns the land, number of homes, 
number of people, set-up of settlement (in a detention pond, wetland, etc.)) 
6. What is the leadership structure of ISN like? 
a. How do you recruit new leaders/members? 
b. Do you know how many leaders are women, and how many are men? 
7. How are decisions made? 
8. How are responsibilities delegated? 
9. How are activities monitored/reported? 
10. How do non-ISN members participate (or not)? 
11. How do ward committees and councillors fit in or work with ISN? 
12. What are the main challenges that ISN tries to address in informal settlements? 
  
ISN Activities 
1. What types of activities does ISN engage in in informal settlements? 
2. What activities does ISN engage in related to stormwater/flood risk reduction? 
a. What are some ways that flood risk can be reduced in the settlements you 
work in? 
3. What have been some of the main enabling factors leading to ISN’s 
accomplishments? 
4. What are the main challenges ISN faces? 
a. How do you think these challenges can be overcome? 
  
Relationship with City of Cape Town 
 1.  What services does the city provide in the settlements you work in? 




2. How does ISN engage with the city of Cape Town? 
1. What regulations/policies/relationships does ISN use to help secure services or 
responses from the city? 
2. Particularly around flooding? 
3. What challenges do you face with working with the city of Cape Town? 
1. What is the nature of these challenges (technical, political, resource-based, 
etc.)? 
2. Can you provide some examples? 
4. Can you share some success stories of working with the City? 
5. What could the City do or provide to make ISN’s work easier? 
6. Have you experienced situations where the city’s actions on the ground don’t seem to 
line up with their policies? In detention ponds, for example? 
7. Has anything changed since the CoCt Mayor signed an MOU in 2012 promising 
increased basic service delivery? 
8. Have you noticed changes in flood policies, regulations, or procedures over time? 
Have they been an improvement or not? 
  
Relationship with NGOs 
1. How does the NGO support ISN? 
2. Do you work with any other NGOs? 
3. Do you face any challenges working with these organizations? 
  
Environmental Considerations 
1. Does ISN discuss sustainability or resilience in reference to their activities? 
2. Do ISN’s strategies see the environment as something important to consider, or do 
social considerations usually take precedent? 
3. Does ISN consider how the environment (and climate change) might impact their 
activities or the settlements they work in? 
4. Generally, do people in settlements see climate change as an important concern? 
5. Have you experienced any changes in flooding, fires, etc. that might be related to the 










City of Cape Town Officials (5) 
 
Prompts 
1. Can you tell me about how you became involved with the municipality, and what 
your roles and responsibilities are for managing flood risk in informal settlements? 
2. Why is flooding a challenge? 
3. How are plans and policies for flood risk developed?  
4. Can you explain how you work with NGOs and community-based organisations to 
reduce and respond to flood risk in settlements? 




1. What is your role within the municipality for managing flood risk in informal 
settlements? 
2. How long have you been in this position? 
3. How did you get involved with this type of work? 
4. What are the biggest challenges in managing flood risk in informal settlements? 
 
Flood Policies and Procedures 
1. What are the different policies, regulations and procedures that address flood risk 
reduction? 
2. How does decision-making around flood policies and procedures work? 
3. How do the different departments collaborate on flood risk? 
4. How is the “Winter Readiness Plan” developed every year?  
a. Does it change from year to year? 
5. What kind of data goes into the decision making process? 
a. How is the data collected? 
6. Are community members consulted in the decision-making process? 
a. How do you choose which community members are consulted? 
7. What is the city’s policy on developing or providing services in detention ponds, 
wetlands, and private land? 
a. Are exceptions ever made, for example, if a community has been living in the 
area for a certain amount of years, and it is no longer functioning as a 
detention pond/wetland? 
8. How are policies and procedures evaluated after the fact (post-Winter)?  
9. Looking back, what could have been improved this past winter? 
10. How does Cape Town’s position as one of the 100 resilient cities influence policies 
and procedures around reducing flood risk, particularly in informal settlements? 
 
Relationship with NGOs and Communities 
1. Do you coordinate with any NGO’s to plan for flood risk reduction, or to gather 
information about informal settlements? 




b. Have you ever collaborated with the NGO, or ISN? 
2. What type of collaboration do you do with NGOs or community members on 
proactive measures to reduce flood risk? 
3. Do you ever collaborate directly with communities, or ward councillors? 
4. How does the “Be Flood-Wise Programme” work? 
a. What impacts has this programme had?  
b. Did community members help design this program? 
c. Where and when was it rolled out? 
5. Are there long-term plans for reducing flood risk in informal settlements? 
6. What are the main challenges you face in working with NGOs and/or communities? 
7. What are the main benefits of working with NGO/s and/or communities? 











1. Can you explain how you became involved with this NGO, and what your roles and 
responsibilities are in this position? 
2. Why is flooding a challenge in the communities you work with? 
3. Can you explain how you work with ISN and the municipality to reduce and respond 
to flood risk in informal settlements? 
4. How has flood management changed over time, and how could it better in the future? 





1. What are your roles and responsibilities at this NGO? 
2. How long have you been in this position? 
3. How did you get involved with this type of work? 
4. Does this NGO have any programs or projects addressing flood risk in informal 
settlements? 
5. What do you see as the biggest challenges in managing flood risk in informal 
settlements? 
 
Programs and Projects 
1. What programs or projects does this NGO have that address flood risk? 
a. [if none directly] Which programs or projects address underlying 
vulnerabilities, such as unemployment, housing, service provision, and 
political capacitating?  
2. Who decides which programs and projects will take place? 
a. What role does the community play in this process? 
 
Relationship with CoCT 
1. What services does the city provide in the settlements you work in? 
a. Which services are working well and which are not working well? 
2. How does this NGO engage with the city of Cape Town? 
a. What is the nature of the relationship? (Who makes the decisions, leads the 
charge, etc.) 
b. What regulations/policies/relationships does this NGO use to help secure 
services or responses from the city? 
c. Particularly around flooding? 
3. What challenges do you face with working with the city of Cape Town? 
a. What is the nature of these challenges (technical, political, resource-based, 
etc.)? 
b. Can you provide some examples? 




5. What could the City do or provide to make your work easier? 
6. Have you experienced situations where the city’s actions on the ground don’t seem to 
line up with their policies? In detention ponds, for example? 
7. Has anything changed since the CoCt Mayor signed an MOU in 2012 promising 
increased basic service delivery? 
8. Have you noticed changes in flood policies, regulations, or procedures over time? 
Have they been an improvement or not? 
 
Relationship with Communities  
1. What level of influence does ISN have over the programs and projects that the NGO 
offers? 
2. How is the effectiveness of the programs and projects evaluated? 
3. What challenges do you face in working with ISN? 
4. Do you witness any internal challenges among ISN members? 
5. Can you share some of your greatest success stories in working with ISN? 




1. Does this NGO discuss sustainability or resilience in reference to their activities? 
2. Do your strategies see the environment as something important to consider, or do 
social considerations usually take precedent? 
3. Does this NGO consider how the environment (and climate change) might impact 
their activities or the settlements they work in? 
4. Generally, do you think people in settlements see climate change as an important 
concern? 
5. Have the informal settlements experienced any changes in flooding, fires, etc. that 




















Ward Councillors (3) 
 
Prompts 
1. Can you tell me about how you became involved with politics, your responsibilities as 
ward councillor, and the ward committees’ responsibilities to the community?  
2. Why is flooding a challenge in the communities you work in? 
3. Can you explain how you and the committee work with the city, NGOs and/or 
community-based organisations to reduce and respond to flood risk?  
4. How has flood management changed over time, and how could it better in the future? 
5. Do community members ever raise environmental or climate change risks as issues of 
concern? 
 
Specific Questions  
General 
1. How long have you been ward councillor? 
2. How did you get involved with politics? 
3. Which neighbourhoods are in your jurisdiction? 
4. What is the current makeup of the ward committee? 
a. Gender balance? 
b. Sectoral representation? 
5. What are your responsibilities as ward councillor? 
6. How do you communicate with your constituents?   
7. How do you identify issues of concern in the community? 
a. What are the main challenges identified by the community? 
8. Are you involved with any ongoing ward projects?  
9. What responsibilities does ward government have for managing flood risk? 
10. What measures do you take to reduce flood risk before heavy rain is expected? 
11. What support is provided after flooding occurs to assist residents who have been 
flooded? 
 
Relationship with City of Cape Town 
1.  What services does the city provide in the settlements you work in? 
a. Which services are working well and which are not working well? 
2. Do you work with the municipality to reduce flood risks in communities? 
3. What challenges do you face in working with the city? 
a. What is the nature of these challenges (technical, political, resource-based, 
etc.)? 
b. Can you provide some examples? 
4. Can you share any success stories from working with the city? 
5. What could the city provide to make it easier for the ward committee to address issues 
of concern in the community, particularly around flood risk? 
6. Have you experienced situations where the city’s actions on the ground don’t seem to 




7. Has anything changed since the CoCt Mayor signed an MOU in 2012 promising 
increased basic service delivery? 
8. Have you noticed changes in flood policies, regulations, or procedures over time? 
Have they been an improvement or not? 
 
Relationship with Community/ISN  
1. Do you coordinate with any NGO’s to plan for flood risk reduction, or to gather 
information about informal settlements? 
a. How do you choose the NGO’s you work with? 
2. Do you work with any community-based organisations? 
a. Have you ever collaborated with the NGO, or ISN? 
3. What type of collaboration do you do with community-based organisations on actions 
to reduce flood risk? 
4. What are the main challenges you face in working with community-based 
organisations? 
5. What are the main benefits of working with community-based organisations? 
6. Have the working relationships with NGOs or community-based organisations 
changed over time? 
 
Environmental Considerations 
1. Is the ward committee concerned with sustainability or resilience in communities? 
2. Do you think community members see the environment as something important to 
consider, or do social considerations usually take precedent?  
3. Generally, do you think people in settlements see climate change as an important 
concern? 
4. Have the informal settlements experienced any changes in flooding, fires, etc. that 





9.3 Consent Form  
DEPARTMENT OF AFRICAN CLIMATE DEVELOPMENT 




UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN 
PRIVATE BAG X3 
RONDEBOSCH 7701  
SOUTH AFRICA 
RESEARCHER: Ashley Fox 
TELEPHONE: +27-78-375-4701 
FACSIMILE: n/a  




Informed Voluntary Consent to Participate in Research Study 
Project Title: The Political Ecology of Community-based Adaptation to Flood Risk in 
Informal Settlements: The case of the Informal Settlement Network (ISN) 
Invitation to participate, and benefits: You are invited to participate in a research study 
conducted with members of ISN, NGO employees, City of Cape Town officials, and ward 
councillors. The study aim is to understand the potential for community-based adaptation to 
flood risk in informal settlements by exploring multi-scalar governance. I believe that your 
experience would be a valuable source of information, and hope that by participating you 
may gain useful knowledge. 
Procedures: During this study, you will be asked to talk about your experience in working 
with the other study participants (mentioned above) in managing flood risk in informal 
settlements.  
Risks: There are no potentially harmful risks related to your participation in this study.  
Disclaimer/Withdrawal: Your participation is completely voluntary; you may refuse to 
participate, and you may withdraw at any time without having to state a reason and without 
any prejudice or penalty against you. Should you choose to withdraw, the researcher commits 
not to use any of the information you have provided without your signed consent. Note that 
the researcher may also withdraw you from the study at any time. 
Confidentiality: All information collected in this study will be kept private in that you will not 
be identified by name or by any other personally identifying information. Confidentiality and 
anonymity will be maintained as pseudonyms will be used. Although confidentiality and 
personal anonymity will be maintained through the use of pseudonyms, it might be necessary 
to use your affiliation (i.e., NGO, ISN, Ward Councillor, City of Cape Town) when reporting 
on the findings of this work. Other identifiers, such as department, or area of jurisdiction, will 
not be identified.  
What signing this form means: 
By signing this consent form, you agree to participate in this research study. The aim, 
procedures to be used, as well as the potential risks and benefits of your participation have been 
explained verbally to you in detail, using this form. Refusal to participate in or withdrawal from 
this study at any time will have no effect on you in any way. You are free to contact me, to ask 





I agree to participate in this research (tick one box) 
 
      Yes  No _________ (Initials) 
 
______________________________ _________________________________ ________ 
Name of Participant Signature of Participant Date 
______________________________ _________________________________ ________ 
Name of Researcher Signature of  Researcher Date 
